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ABSTRACT 
  Section 112 of the Patent Act requires patentees to clearly explain 
what their invention is (a requirement known as claim definiteness), 
as well as how to make and use it (the disclosure requirements of 
enablement and written description). Many concerns about the 
modern patent system stem from these requirements. But despite the 
critical importance of § 112 to the functioning of the patent system, 
there is surprisingly little empirical data about how it has been applied 
in practice. To remedy the reliance on anecdotes, we have created a 
hand-coded dataset of 1144 reported court decisions from 1982 to 
2012 in which U.S. district courts or the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit rendered a decision on the enablement, written-
description, or claim-definiteness requirements of § 112. We coded 
validity outcomes under these three doctrines on a novel five-level 
scale so as to capture significant subtlety in the strength of each 
decision, and we also classified patents by technology and industry 
categories. We also coded for a number of litigation characteristics 
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that could arguably influence outcomes. Although one must be 
cautious about generalizing from reported decisions due to selection 
effects, our results show some statistically significant disparities in 
§ 112 outcomes for different technologies and industries—although 
fewer than the conventional wisdom suggests, and not always in the 
direction that many have believed. Just as importantly, our analysis 
reveals significant relationships between other variables and § 112 
litigation outcomes, including whether a district court or the Federal 
Circuit made the last decision in a case, whether a patent claim was 
drafted in means-plus-function format, and whether a case was 
decided before or after Markman v. Westview Instruments. Our 
results showing how § 112 has been applied in practice will be helpful 
in evaluating current proposals for reform, and our rich dataset will 
enable more systematic studies of these critical doctrines in the future. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 611 
I.  Is § 112 Technology Specific? ............................................................ 616 
A. Heightened Standards in Biotechnology and 
Chemistry? ............................................................................. 621 
B. Lower Standards in Software and Business Methods? ..... 624 
C. Prior Empirical Work ........................................................... 625 
II.  Data and Methodology ..................................................................... 628 
A. Data Collection ..................................................................... 628 
B. Case Outcomes ...................................................................... 630 
C. Technology and Industry Classifications ............................ 632 
1. Technologies ...................................................................... 633 
2. Industries ............................................................................ 639 
D. Other Variables ..................................................................... 643 
III.  Results ............................................................................................... 644 
A. Overall Outcomes ................................................................. 645 
B. Outcomes by Technology ..................................................... 645 
1. Scores on Ordinal Scales ................................................... 645 
2. Regression Results by Technologies and Issues .............. 649 
C. Outcomes by Industry........................................................... 660 
1. Scores on Ordinal Scales ................................................... 660 
2. Regression Results by Industries and Issues .................... 665 
D. Summary: Does the Subject Matter of Patents Really 
Matter in § 112 Decisions? ................................................... 668 
IV.  Caveats and Implications ................................................................ 669 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 674 
Appendix .................................................................................................. 676 
ALLISON & OUELLETTE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015 7:53 AM 
2016] PATENT DEFINITENESS AND DISCLOSURE 611 
INTRODUCTION 
In exchange for the rights provided by a patent, section 112 of 
the Patent Act requires patentees to clearly explain what their 
invention is (a requirement known as claim definiteness), as well as 
how to make and use it (the disclosure requirements of enablement 
and written description).1 These requirements are at the root of many 
concerns about the modern patent system. Patents cannot serve as 
efficient property rights if no one can determine their boundaries, and 
disclosure failures can lead to patents that cover far more than was 
actually invented. Better enforcement of § 112 thus may be the best 
way to address the problem of “patent trolls” asserting overbroad and 
unclear patents.2 Commentators also have frequently opined that 
despite patent law’s nominal uniformity across different technologies 
or industries,3 disclosure and definiteness are applied dissimilarly by 
courts to different technologies and industries.4 But despite the 
critical importance of § 112 to the functioning of the patent system, 
there is surprisingly little empirical data about how it has been 
applied in practice. In this Article, we seek to remedy this empirical 
dearth. 
Understanding the state of § 112 litigation is particularly 
important in light of the growing conflict over the application of these 
patentability requirements. Commentators have argued, for example, 
that the written-description doctrine should be eliminated,5 and that 
the enablement and definiteness requirements should be enforced 
 
 1. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring that a patent “enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same,” “contain a written description of the 
invention,” and “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming . . . the invention”); infra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Peter S. Menell in Support of Neither Party 
at 3–4, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (No. 13-369); Mark A. 
Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 905–06.  
 3. See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 48 (2008).  
 4. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific]; see 
also infra Part I (reviewing this literature). 
 5. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1361–67 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the en banc majority’s holding that § 112 
contains a written-description requirement that is separate from the enablement requirement); 
Allen K. Yu, The En Banc Federal Circuit’s Written Description Requirement: Time for the 
Supreme Court to Reverse Again?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 895, 964–66 (2012) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court should intervene to fix problems with the written-description requirement). 
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much more stringently.6 The Supreme Court set forth a new test for 
indefiniteness in 2014, the contours of which remain uncertain.7 Our 
results on how § 112 has been applied in practice will be helpful in 
evaluating current proposals for reform, and our rich dataset—which 
we are making publicly available—will enable more systematic 
studies of these critical doctrines in the future.8 
We have attempted to collect every case over the thirty-year 
period from 1982 to 2012 in which a U.S. district court or the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the court that hears most patent 
appeals) rendered a reported decision—including denials of summary 
judgment—involving any of three § 112 issues: enablement, written 
description, or claim definiteness. We explain these three doctrines in 
more detail in Part I. In short, definiteness requires that other skilled 
individuals in the particular field understand what the claimed 
invention is, while enablement and written description require that 
they understand how to make and use the invention and that the 
inventor actually envisioned the claimed invention. Our dataset 
contains 1144 decisions on at least one of these issues. We hand coded 
the outcomes of these cases using a five-level ordinal scale, allowing 
us to capture subtleties in the strength of each decision. We compare 
these results to coarser validity outcomes. We placed each patent in 
one of six technology categories (plus a secondary technology area 
when warranted) and in one of eleven industry categories.9 We also 
 
 6. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Peter S. Menell in Support of Neither Party, 
supra note 2, at 36–42; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 586–96 (2012). 
 7. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128–31; see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 831, 836–43 (2015) (evaluating the standard of review for a claim construction that was the 
basis for the district court’s decision on claim definiteness). 
 8. The dataset and the Stata files for creating the regressions presented here are available 
in the Duke Law Scholarship Repository at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/. 
 9. The technologies, described in detail below, are (1) mechanical, (2) electrical, 
(3) chemistry, (4) biotechnology, (5) software (with subcategories of business-method software 
patents and non-business-method software patents), and (6) optics. The industries are 
(1) computer and other electronics, (2) semiconductor, (3) pharmaceutical (with subcategories 
based on whether the litigation started with a generic company filing an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA)), (4) medical devices, methods, and other medical, (5) biotechnology, 
(6) communications, (7) transportation (including automotive), (8) construction, (9) energy, 
(10) goods and services for consumer uses, and (11) goods and services for industrial and 
business uses. These are essentially the same technology and industry categories developed by 
one of the current authors for previous studies. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David 
L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1085–89 (2015) [hereinafter 
Allison et al., Divided Patent System]; John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, 
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coded numerous control variables that might separately influence 
§ 112 outcomes. 
Our results include the following: 
First, descriptive results reveal differences in outcomes on some 
§ 112 issues for different technologies and industries. Among 
technologies, patents in the traditional fields of electrical, mechanics, 
and chemistry were less likely to be invalidated than patents in 
biotechnology, optics, and software in cases litigated to a decision. 
Perhaps surprisingly, software-implemented business-method patents 
were more likely to survive § 112 challenges than more technical 
software patents not covering business methods. 
Among industry groups, our descriptive results also showed what 
appear to be meaningful distinctions: patents in the consumer goods 
and services, pharmaceuticals related to Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) litigation,10 construction, semiconductor, 
energy, and biotechnology industry groupings were less likely to be 
invalidated for the three § 112 issues combined, while those in the 
transportation (including automotive), industrial/business goods and 
services, medical devices and methods, communications, 
pharmaceutical (all), computer and other electronics, and non-
ANDA pharmaceutical-industry categories were more likely to be 
invalidated. Notably, there was a large performance drop-off to the 
bottom two (computers/electronics and pharmaceuticals not involved 
in ANDA litigation). 
Second, in regression models, including those controlling for 
other possible influences on § 112 outcomes, many of the distinctions 
among technology groups were not statistically significant. Several 
statistically significant differences did remain, however: electrical 
patents were less likely to be invalidated than those in other 
technology fields on written description and were bested only by 
mechanical patents on enablement. At the other end of the 
technology spectrum, software patents on inventions other than 
business methods fared poorly on enablement. 
 
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1772–76 (2014) 
[hereinafter Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation]. 
 10. As explained below, litigation that starts with a generic manufacturer filing an ANDA 
may be different from non-ANDA-related pharmaceutical litigation, and the litigated patents 
themselves may be different on average. See infra note 131We thus report results both with all 
pharmaceutical litigation combined, and with it separated into ANDA and non-ANDA cases. 
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There were also only a few statistically significant differences 
across industry categories. Patents in the computer and electronics 
industry were very likely to be invalidated for lack of enablement 
after accounting for all of the other factors in our model. Patents in 
the pharmaceutical industry that were tested in litigation not 
triggered by a generic drug maker’s filing of an ANDA also fared 
poorly on both written-description and definiteness grounds, likely 
because these patents mostly relate to various methods rather than 
FDA-approved drug compositions. On the other hand, patents in the 
semiconductor industry and in consumer goods and services were 
significantly more likely than those in other industry categories to 
survive invalidity challenges based on the written-description 
requirement. 
Third, three other independent variables had significant 
(sometimes highly significant) correlations with litigated § 112 
outcomes, regardless of technology or industry: 
  1. District courts were much more likely than the Federal Circuit 
to uphold patents accused of failing the enablement and definiteness 
requirements, regardless of either technology or industry. 
  2. Decisions rendered after the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments11 (affirmed by the Supreme 
Court) were significantly more likely than those made earlier to be 
in favor of a patent’s definiteness in our technology regressions and 
significantly more likely in the industry regressions. 
  3. With a high degree of significance, regardless of either 
technology or industry, and regardless of whether a district court or 
the Federal Circuit rendered the final decision in the case, patent 
 
 11. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that interpretation of patent claims is for the court, not the jury). 
Markman gave rise to the eponymous “Markman hearing,” which typically involves significant 
pretrial discovery and focuses on the interpretation of disputed terms in patent claims. See 
PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 2-23 (3d ed. 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2637605 [http://perma.cc/V4UC-5M84]. Because resolving disputes 
over the meaning of claim language is a prerequisite to decisions about patent validity and 
infringement, the results of Markman hearings are frequently outcome determinative. See id. at 
2-30. Such hearings also have brought § 112 issues even more to the forefront than previously 
had been the case, because definiteness, enablement, and written-description issues all deal with 
the claims (as interpreted) and the written description and drawings (the “specification”) that 
must provide adequate support for the claims. Trial judges sometimes make final rulings on 
claim-indefiniteness assertions as part of the orders that follow claim construction, although 
they may defer such decisions until the summary-judgment stage or until after trial. See id. at 5-
100 to 5-101. 
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claims drafted in means-plus-function12 format were more likely than 
those drafted in other formats to be held indefinite.13 The Federal 
Circuit embraced the use of indefiniteness to invalidate overbroad 
means-plus-function software patents in 2008 in Aristocrat v. 
International Game,14 but the effect we observed persisted even 
when all software patents were removed from the dataset, and when 
we limited the analysis to pre-2008 decisions, revealing that this 
result is not purely driven by Aristocrat. 
Fourth, a number of our control variables had little to no 
statistically significant effect on outcomes despite indications in prior 
research that some of these variables might have an influence on 
litigation outcomes. For example, whether a lawsuit was initiated by a 
potential infringer as a declaratory-judgment action rather than by a 
patent owner as an infringement action had only a weak effect,15 and 
the foreign origin of an invention or a foreign priority filing by the 
patent applicant were not significantly associated with any different 
 
 12. A claim element “may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified 
function,” which then limits the claim to the “corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). “[A] means-
plus-function clause is indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to 
recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in 
the claim.” Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting AllVoice 
Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  
 13. One may find patent claims drafted to cover a machine, an apparatus or device, an 
“article of manufacture” (such as a product), a composition of matter (such as a chemical 
composition or composite with defined elements and proportions), or a method (a process or 
technique). It is common to find claims on the same invention drafted in more than one of these 
formats in the same patent, which is done for fail-safe purposes in light of the imperfect nature 
of language in describing anything with great precision. 
 14. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 15. Prior research by John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz showed that 
potential infringers who instituted the lawsuit first by filing an action for declaratory judgment 
of noninfringement and invalidity fared better on several specific outcomes (including winning 
the case outright) than when such parties asserted noninfringement and invalidity as defendants 
in a counterclaim when they were sued for infringement. Most notably, this result was 
independent of any effect on outcomes associated with the federal district in which the case was 
decided. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1798. Unlike 
the present study, however, that research used a dataset of cases filed in 2008 and 2009 that 
resulted in substantive decisions by the end of 2013. Id. at 1769. It analyzed the results of ten 
separate litigation outcomes and used a different approach to coding those outcomes—namely, 
it based its coding on whether particular outcomes were favorable to the patent owner or the 
accused infringer and did not use an ordinal scale to assess the strength of outcomes as does the 
present study. Id. at 1792–94.  
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likelihood of a given § 112 outcome.16 In addition, whether a patent 
was reissued showed no association with outcome differences, and we 
found no effects on the likelihood of any outcome associated with the 
federal district in which the case was decided. 
Finally, we reran all of our regressions with a continuous-year 
variable in addition to the post-Markman variable, which should 
capture whether doctrine shifted over time aside from the shift 
precipitated by Markman. Including this variable had little effect on 
our results. 
Our Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we review the 
conventional wisdom about how courts have applied § 112 to 
different technologies. Part II describes our data-collection strategy 
and coding methodology. Part III presents our empirical results. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of our findings, as well as 
caveats in their interpretation. Most importantly, while we are 
confident that our results show how courts have adjudicated patent 
disclosure and definiteness in cases that led to a reported decision 
(including denials of summary judgment), one must be cautious 
before generalizing from these results to broader populations. Not all 
patents are litigated; not all litigated patents have their validity 
challenged under § 112; and not all § 112 challenges result in a 
decision reported on Westlaw. In Part IV, we offer some suggestions 
about how these selection effects might affect § 112 outcomes. 
Despite this limitation, we think that even providing a detailed 
picture of the state of § 112 litigation in cases litigated to decision will 
enrich discussions of § 112 reform, and we hope that other 
researchers will use and build on our dataset for further empirical 
studies. 
I.  IS § 112 TECHNOLOGY SPECIFIC? 
The Supreme Court often describes patents as bargains between 
inventors and society.17 In return for the exclusive rights provided by a 
 
 16. Previous research showed that owners of patents covering foreign-origin inventions 
performed better than their U.S.-origin counterparts on some important outcomes. See id. at 
1796–97.  
 17. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) 
(“[E]xclusive patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.”); 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The disclosure 
required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) 
(“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation 
ALLISON & OUELLETTE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015 7:53 AM 
2016] PATENT DEFINITENESS AND DISCLOSURE 617 
patent,18 the inventor must teach others how to create the invention. 
In particular, section 112 of the Patent Act requires that the 
inventor’s written description and drawings in combination (the 
patent’s “specification”) must be sufficiently complete and thorough 
so as to enable a “person having ordinary skill in the art” (a 
PHOSITA, in patent law argot) to make and put into practice the 
invention without having to engage in an undue amount of 
experimentation, and must demonstrate that at the time of 
application the inventor clearly envisioned the claimed invention.19 
The former, commonly called the “enablement” requirement, and the 
latter, the “written-description” requirement, are closely related.20 In 
addition, the patent bargain requires the inventor to clearly notify the 
public21 of the exact contours of the property interest sought by 
writing “claims” that specify the invention with particularity and 
distinctness.22 
These three requirements—enablement, written description, and 
definiteness—help ensure that the patent teaches other individuals 
 
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive 
monopoly for a limited period of time.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“In consideration of [the invention’s] disclosure and the consequent 
benefit to the community, the patent is granted.” (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser 
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933))); Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481 (“[S]uch additions [from patent 
disclosures] to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that the 
Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its 
disclosure . . . .”). 
 18. “Exclusive right” is stated in the positive for reading ease, but the rights of a patent 
owner, like the rights of owners of other types of property, are negative in nature. A patent 
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell an identical 
invention within the United States or from importing such an invention into the United States. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 19. Id. § 112(a) (requiring that a patent “enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains . . . to make and use the same” and “contain a written description of the invention”). 
Section 112 was renumbered and slightly edited by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). These technical changes are not relevant to our 
discussion here. 
 20. The Federal Circuit recently affirmed the existence of written description as a separate 
patentability requirement from enablement, see Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), although commentators have criticized this distinction, see, e.g., 
Yu, supra note 5, at 911–19. We do not take a position in this debate; rather, we focus only on 
describing how the § 112 requirements have been applied in practice. 
 21. The “public” is that of relevant PHOSITAs.  
 22. “The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the 
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
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skilled in the field what the invention is and how to reproduce it.23 
(Section 112 also requires that the patent “set forth the best mode . . . 
of carrying out the invention,”24 but granted patents may no longer be 
invalidated for failure to disclose the best mode,25 so we do not 
analyze this requirement here.) 
The enablement and written-description requirements are 
closely related in that both seek to prevent a mismatch between the 
disclosures in the patent specification and one or more of the claims 
in that same document. For example, the greater the breadth of a 
particular claim, the higher the probability that the specification will 
not have adequately enabled the claim and will not have revealed 
exactly the invention delineated in the claim.26 The reverse is likewise 
true. But the enablement and written-description requirements also 
are distinct in that it is not only possible, but quite common, to violate 
one but not the other. The specification can reveal that the applying 
inventor clearly had in mind the exact invention in a claim that is at 
 
 23. For a review of the disclosure requirements, see generally Ouellette, supra note 6, at 
550–54 (“[T]his part briefly reviews the current legal standard for disclosure in the United States 
as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Failure to fulfill the written-description requirement occurs when that description does 
not “describe the invention sufficiently to convey to a person of skill in the art that the patentee 
had possession of the claimed invention at the time of the application, i.e., that the patentee 
invented what is claimed.” LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Violations of this disclosure requirement are more likely to occur when the 
language of a claim is altered or a new claim is added after initial filing, either during 
prosecution of the application in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) or later in a 
“continuing” application. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING § 2163.05 (9th ed. 2014) (“The failure to meet the written description 
requirement . . . commonly arises when claims are changed after filing to either broaden or 
narrow the breadth of the claim limitations, or to alter a numerical range limitation or to use 
claim language that is not synonymous with the terminology used in the original disclosure.”). 
Although the details of prosecution strategy are far beyond the scope of this Article, in general, 
claims can be changed or added without direct penalty either during prosecution or in a 
continuing application that is filed while either the original application or another “ancestor” 
application in an application chain is still pending, but the specification cannot. See, e.g., 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Nothing about a continuation 
or divisional patent makes it inherently more likely to fail the written description requirement 
or changes the burden of proof with respect to proving invalidity.”). This fact leads to the very 
real possibility of a disconnect existing between the specification and a particular claim. See, e.g., 
PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1247–48 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In this case, the 
originally filed application, which is devoid of any mention or even implication that the two 
chemicals can be applied in a spaced, sequential manner, does not support the later-added 
claim.”). Statutory authority for continuing applications and requirements for retaining the 
earlier filing date are found in 35 U.S.C. § 120.  
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issue, thus fulfilling the written-description requirement, but did not 
supply enough detail about, for example, manufacturing processes, 
materials, or software algorithms to enable a skilled person in the 
technology field to make and use this claimed invention, either at all 
or without having to resort to unreasonable experimentation.27 
Conversely, the specification may contain such far-ranging and 
thorough explanation of the relevant technology and the details of 
making and using various related inventions so as to enable a 
PHOSITA to make and use a class of inventions that includes the one 
in the claim of concern, but that same specification may reveal no 
signs that the inventor had this particular invention in mind when 
filing the patent application.28 
The third § 112 issue of interest, claim definiteness, demands that 
the patent claims clearly demarcate the boundaries of the property 
interests for which the inventor seeks protection. This requirement 
has recently been in flux, with a potentially major change having 
occurred in the Supreme Court’s 2014 Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments29 
decision. For some time, the Federal Circuit had required that a claim 
need only be susceptible to construction and not “insolubly 
ambiguous” to satisfy the definiteness requirement.30 Toward the end 
of its 2014 Term, however, the Supreme Court arguably abrogated 
this lax standard by calling for the language of a patent claim to 
delineate the invention such that a PHOSITA can understand its 
scope with “reasonable certainty.”31 Although the Court’s language 
 
 27. For example, certain biotechnology patents are not enabled without placing necessary 
microorganisms in a public-materials depository, even if the patent document clearly satisfies 
the written-description requirement. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to 
Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1, 
¶¶ 102–05 (explaining the use of these depositories to satisfy the enablement requirement). 
 28. Explaining in the abstract how a patent specification can enable a given claim but fail to 
fulfill the written-description requirement for that same claim is reminiscent of explaining in the 
abstract how to pull the engine and transmission from a Mack truck. Many cases provide 
concrete examples. See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Gentry Gallery, 
Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 
1559, 1569–71 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
 29. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
 30. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). For an argument that the PTO has allowed many patents to issue with improperly 
uncertain claim language by following Federal Circuit precedent that should apply only to 
issued patents with their strong presumption of validity and not to those in a patent application 
before it has been allowed, see Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference 
Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 689–96 (2015).  
 31. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124 (“In place of the ‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard, we hold 
that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification 
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seems to call for imposition of a stricter definiteness requirement, its 
actual impact largely remains to be seen.32 
The Patent Act contains no indication that these § 112 
requirements should be applied differently to different technologies, 
and the international Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)—which imposes minimum 
levels of IP protection on all members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)—prohibits “discrimination as to . . . the field of 
technology” in national patent laws.33 Although some have doubted 
the wisdom of continuing the unitary model because of the different 
needs of innovators in different fields,34 a move toward separate 
patenting rules for particular technologies or industries would 
produce unintended negative effects. For example, such an approach 
would inevitably lead to strategic drafting to fit more favorable 
technology classifications, which would further lead to increased 
transaction costs associated with tortuous drafting to make an 
invention appear to be something it is not.35 
 
delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, 
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”).  
 32. Although some lower-court decisions have ruled on challenges to the definiteness of 
patent claims since the Supreme Court’s Nautilus decision, it is beyond the scope of this 
empirical Article to engage in a doctrinal analysis of the decision’s effect on lower-court rulings. 
For a discussion of how the Federal Circuit’s treatment of indefiniteness may be slowly starting 
to change, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Dow v. Nova: Maybe Nautilus Does Matter, WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION BLOG (Aug. 28, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/08/
dow-v-nova-maybe-nautilus-does-matter.html [http://perma.cc/UR5B-PB2A]. 
 33. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [https://perma.cc/99KB-
PBVK].  
 34. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of 
Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1406–07 (2011); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating 
Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 321–24; Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent 
Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 672–73 (2014); Neel 
U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1882–86 (2015). For a critique of the dominant push toward 
uniformity in patent law on policy-learning grounds, see generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015).  
 35. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Reforming Patent 
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
729, 786 (2006). This paper provides evidence that patent attorneys strategically drafted 
applications to avoid the PTO’s “business method” classification when the agency increased 
scrutiny of such claims through its “second pair of eyes” initiative in March 2000. Id. A patent 
attorney is, of course, not wrong in doing this, and doing so is probably within the scope of her 
obligation to the client to save time and money. Patent attorneys have done similar things over 
the years to disguise software patents as judicial approaches toward such patents have waxed 
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But many observers of the patent system have argued that “while 
patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology specific in 
application,”36 including in the application of § 112. The following two 
Sections describe the conventional wisdom that § 112 is applied more 
vigorously to patents in biotechnology and chemistry but is rarely 
used to invalidate claims in software. Then, in Section I.C, we review 
the few prior empirical studies of how § 112 has been applied in 
practice. 
A. Heightened Standards in Biotechnology and Chemistry? 
Many commentators have suggested that courts apply a higher 
enablement and written-description standard in biotechnology and 
chemistry, particularly in more recent cases. For example, Arti Rai 
wrote that the Federal Circuit “has used the written description 
requirement in a manner that somewhat raises the patentability bar” 
for biotechnology inventions.37 Sean Seymore has similarly stated that 
“[i]n contrast to the applied sciences (like electrical and mechanical 
engineering), the judiciary has required more detailed disclosure in 
chemistry and the experimental sciences.”38 Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley have repeatedly written about “stringent enablement and 
written description requirements on biotechnology patents that do 
 
and waned. Id. Patent attorneys likely would be able to engage in such behavior often enough to 
meaningfully undercut attempted reforms based on explicit distinctions between different 
technologies or industries. 
 36. Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1156; see, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The 
Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846–47 (2006); 
Roin, supra note 34, at 676. 
 37. Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (1999). 
 38. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
127, 137 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement]; see also Sean B. Seymore, The 
Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282–83 (2008) 
[hereinafter Seymore, Enablement Pendulum] (noting that chemistry patents have required “a 
specific and detailed teaching” and that the Federal Circuit has made clear that mechanical 
patents are “not in the same category as the chemical arts”). 
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not show up in other disciplines.”39 Many other scholars have picked 
up on this theme.40 
The typical explanation for higher disclosure requirements in 
chemistry and biotechnology is that these are “unpredictable” arts in 
which more details are required than in “predictable” fields such as 
mechanical and electrical inventions.41 But many commentators 
suggest that the written-description standard in biotechnology is 
particularly rigid, with blame placed primarily on the Federal 
Circuit’s 1997 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Eli 
Lilly & Co.42 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit held that the written-
description requirement was not satisfied for a DNA claim without 
disclosure of the DNA sequence.43 Treatise author Janice Mueller 
 
 39. Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1156; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) [hereinafter 
Burk & Lemley, Uncertainty Principle] (“[T]he [Federal Circuit] claims that the uncertain 
nature of [biotechnology] requires imposition of stringent patent enablement and written 
description requirements that are not applied to patents in other disciplines.”); Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1654 (2003) [hereinafter 
Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (expressing the same sentiment). 
 40. For example, student notes have made assertions such as that “[t]he biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries, in particular, have become subject to more stringent written 
description requirements than other industries,” Corrin Nicole Drakulich, Note, University of 
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.: In Search of a Written Description Standard, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 11, 11–12 (2006), and that “heightened enablement and written description 
requirements for biotechnology” have “effectively eliminated patent protection for 
biotechnology inventions pertaining to proteins,” Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents After 
Festo: Rethinking the Heightened Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 11 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 919, 919 (2002). Similar examples are easy to find. See, e.g., Alison E. Cantor, Note, 
Using the Written Description and Enablement Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 268 (2000) (arguing that courts have “appl[ied] aspects of the written 
description and enablement requirements more stringently in this field in order to limit the 
scope of biotechnology patents”); Matthew A. Chivvis, Comment, Improving Innovation by 
Reducing the Risk of Investing in Biotechnology: Fixing the Enablement Standard, 11 INTELL. 
PROP. L. BULL. 205, 206 (2007) (“In its infancy, the biotechnology field faced an incredibly strict 
enablement standard. Yet, as biotechnology has matured and its practitioners’ skills have 
increased, the courts have failed to relax the standard accordingly.” (footnote omitted)); Natalie 
A. Lissy, Note, Patentability of Chemical and Biotechnology Inventions: A Discrepancy in 
Standards, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069, 1085 (2003) (“Because of the unpredictability of the 
properties of seemingly-related compounds, this [written-description] standard is heightened in 
chemical cases.”). Indeed, a search of Westlaw’s law-journal database on January 4, 2015 for 
“heightened,” “strict,” or “stringent” enablement or written description in the context of 
biotechnology had over 100 results. See Law Reviews & Journals, WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com 
(follow “Secondary Sources” hyperlink; then search for [(enablement “written description”) /s 
(biotech!) /s (heightened stringent strict)]). 
 41. See, e.g., Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 38, at 136–39. 
 42. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 43. Id. at 1566–67. 
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calls this “a significant departure from prior written description 
cases” that “sets a significantly higher standard for the protection of 
biotechnological inventions.”44 This case sparked an intense debate 
within the Federal Circuit. When dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc in another written-description case, Chief Judge Rader 
included an appendix of academic commentary, primarily criticizing 
Eli Lilly for its heightened standard.45 Judge Lourie contested this 
point in his explanation of the en banc denial, stating that “it is not 
correct, as has been asserted, that our decisions . . . have created a 
‘heightened’ written description requirement for biotechnology 
inventions” because the court has applied the same standard “to cases 
that are not in the fields of chemistry or biotechnology.”46 
But perhaps the disclosure requirements for biotechnology or 
chemistry inventions are not currently higher than for other 
inventions because the high standard was exported from these fields 
to other arts. For example, Mark Janis has suggested that the written-
description requirement has been “applied with unaccustomed vigor” 
even in the “‘predictable arts” such as mechanics and software, where 
a skilled artisan is more likely to be able to tell whether an invention 
works based simply on reading the patent.47 And both Bernard Chao 
and Sean Seymore have argued that three Federal Circuit cases from 
2007 and 2008 have expanded the strong enablement defense from 
“the unpredictable arts (e.g. chemical or biotechnology)” to 
 
 44. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to 
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998); see also David Kelly, The 
Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description Requirement into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle 
to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology Patents, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249, 250 
(2002) (“In [Eli Lilly], the Federal Circuit imposed a heightened ‘precise definition’ written 
requirement standard for claims to DNA.”).  
 45. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314–24 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Rader, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 46. Id. at 1306 (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing In re 
Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying “heightened” standards to a patent application 
for dental floss); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (artificial hip sockets); 
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (sectional sofas); 
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (automated sales terminals); 
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (double lumen catheters)). 
 47. Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” 
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 60 
(2000). 
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“technology that would normally be considered to fall within the 
predictable arts.”48 
Finally, note that stringent disclosure requirements in 
biotechnology or chemistry do not necessarily mean that the 
definiteness requirement of § 112 is also rigorously applied. Indeed, 
Kevin Collins argues that a high written-description hurdle for 
biotechnology patents “may compensate for the fact that the Federal 
Circuit has failed to apply in the biotechnology sector the means-plus-
function rules that limit the scope of functionally defined claims in 
other sectors.”49 In other words, he suggests that the definiteness 
standard is lower in biotechnology than in other disciplines. 
B. Lower Standards in Software and Business Methods? 
In contrast to biotechnology and chemistry, for software 
innovations the enablement and written-description standards are 
perceived to be quite relaxed. For example, Burk and Lemley have 
argued that “[t]he Federal Circuit has essentially excused software 
inventions from compliance with . . . enablement” and that the high 
written-description standard in biotechnology “would be 
inconceivable in other industries, such as software.”50 Kathy 
Strandburg notes the “low standards for enablement and description” 
in software and business methods.51 Other examples abound,52 and we 
have not found any commentators who dispute this consensus. 
 
 48. Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New 
Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 6–8, http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
stanford-technology-law-review/online/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf [http://perma.cc/PCT7-
KXLE] (discussing Sitrick v. DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (integration of 
audio or visual signal into video games or movies), Automotive Technologies International, Inc. 
v. BMW of North America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (vehicle side-impact crash 
sensors), and Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (medical 
fluid-injection system)); Seymore, Enablement Pendulum, supra note 38, at 286–89 (discussing 
the same three cases); see also Jason Romrell, Note, Biting Off More Than You Can Chew: The 
New Law of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 139, 139 (2008) (arguing that Liebel-
Flarsheim and Automotive Technologies imported the “stringent standard” from biotechnology 
and chemistry to the predictable arts). 
 49. Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the 
Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O. PAT. L.J. 60, 60 
(2010). 
 50. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 39, at 1593, 1653–54; Burk & Lemley, 
Technology-Specific, supra note 4, at 1156 (expressing the same idea); Burk & Lemley, 
Uncertainty Principle, supra note 39, at 706–07 (showing that the written-description 
requirement in software is “antithetical” to that for biotechnology). 
 51. Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 285 (2011). 
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Commentators have also argued that the definiteness 
requirement is insufficiently enforced in the software context. For 
example, Mark Lemley has argued that courts should treat many 
more software patent claims as “means-plus-function” claims under 
35 U.S.C. § 112(f), which are invalid for indefiniteness if they “do not 
detail actual algorithms implementing those functional steps.”53 But 
this does not mean that one would expect to find fewer invalidations 
for indefiniteness in software than other fields—before Nautilus v. 
Biosig, the indefiniteness standard was generally viewed as 
“toothless” for all technologies.54 But even before Nautilus, courts 
were using indefiniteness to curb a number of overbroad software 
patents,55 even if not as often as some commentators would like. 
C. Prior Empirical Work 
The conventional wisdom about the application of § 112 to 
different technologies tends to be based on analyses of a few cases, 
which may not represent broader litigation trends. Although no one 
has comprehensively studied how § 112 outcomes vary by technology 
in the detail we present here, the volume of empirical literature on 
litigation outcomes is growing. Much of this work does not separate 
§ 112 from other invalidity results.56 Other works—including a study 
 
 52. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 961, 1026 (2005) (noting the “low threshold for enablement” in software); Greg R. 
Vetter, Patent Law’s Unpredictability Doctrine and the Software Arts, 76 MO. L. REV. 763, 766 
(2011) (stating that “disclosure burdens are light” for software); Ajeet P. Pai, Note, The Low 
Written Description Bar for Software Inventions, 94 VA. L. REV. 457, 460 (2008) (identifying 
“software’s low written description bar”). 
 53. Lemley, supra note 2, at 945.  
 54. Ronald J. Mann, Argument Preview: Justices To Wade into Morass About “Indefinite” 
Claims in Patents, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
04/argument-preview-justices-to-wade-into-morass-about-indefinite-claims-in-patents [http://
perma.cc/FTK8-MDPR].  
 55. See Lemley, supra note 53, at 945–46 (“[W]hen software patents are actually written 
using ‘means for doing x’ language, the Federal Circuit has been quite strict about requiring 
evidence of real computer programming in the specification.”); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, 
Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software 
Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1451 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has recently begun to 
invalidate means-plus-function software claims for indefiniteness if the patent specification fails 
to disclose an algorithm for achieving the claimed function.”). 
 56. See Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 309 (2011) 
(comparing a randomly selected group of 659 litigated patents issued in 1990 with matched 
nonlitigated patents); Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2006) (examining all 262 dispositive Federal Circuit decisions, including 
affirmances without opinion, from 2002 to 2004); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are 
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by one of us—have examined the separate § 112 doctrines, but do not 
classify cases by technology or industry.57 But a few studies have 
begun to describe how § 112 is applied in different technologies. This 
Section briefly reviews this prior work. 
Chris Holman considered all opinions from the federal courts 
and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) from 
1997 to 2006 that applied the written-description doctrine as set forth 
in the Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly decision.58 As discussed above, many 
commentators viewed this decision as heightening the written-
description requirement for biotechnology.59 Holman found four 
Federal Circuit opinions, one district court opinion, and nine BPAI 
decisions invalidating patent claims under the Eli Lilly rule; in 
comparison, he found six Federal Circuit opinions, ten district court 
opinions, and twenty-two BPAI decisions rejecting validity 
challenges.60 He qualitatively described the technology at issue in each 
case, but was able to conclude only that it remains unclear whether 
Eli Lilly’s written-description doctrine is “particularly directed 
towards biotechnology” or not.61 Other studies that claimed to find 
 
Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent 
Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (examining about 6,300 patent cases filed in 
1995, 1997, and 2000); Michael Risch, The Layered Patent System, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4–5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567415 [http://perma.cc/XK
2D-4VY6] (comparing litigation outcomes from the most litigious nonpracticing entities with 
other randomly selected plaintiffs).  
 57. All published Federal Circuit patentability rulings over five different years were coded 
for validity outcomes in Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An 
Analysis of Federal Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347 (2011), http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/forum/what-are-the-sources-of-patent-inflation-an-analysis-of-federal-
circuit-patentability-rulings [http://perma.cc/GA8D-94GT]. Of these 324 cases, fifteen (5 
percent) involved enablement (four valid/patentable, six mixed rulings, five 
invalid/unpatentable), thirty-two (10 percent) involved written description (eleven valid, nine 
mixed, twelve invalid), and twenty-eight (9 percent) involved indefiniteness (fourteen valid, five 
mixed, nine invalid). Id. at 357–59 (with section 112–specific outcomes drawn from the original 
data).  
 58. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description A Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 1, 4–5 (2007) (searching for written-description cases citing Eli Lilly or any later Federal 
Circuit cases that applied the Eli Lilly rule). Dennis Crouch also examined written-description 
decisions of the BPAI in a subsequent study; he showed which technology centers the decisions 
studied came from, but he did not give outcomes by technology. Dennis Crouch, Essay, An 
Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1676–78 (2010). 
 59. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 60. Holman, supra note 58, at 26, 37, 42, 58, 70. 
 61. Id. at 80–81. 
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differences between technologies were similarly limited by small 
sample sizes.62 
The most detailed data comes from an article in which one of us 
examined all substantive patent-litigation decisions in cases filed in 
2008 and 2009 using the same technology and industry classifications 
reported here.63 That study reveals some interesting insights into § 112 
litigation, but whether any of the regression results for inadequate 
disclosure (enablement or written description) and indefiniteness are 
statistically significant depends on which of several model 
specifications is employed,64 making it difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions. That study is also limited to cases filed in only two years, 
rather than the much broader time range examined here. 
 
 62. In one, Christa Laser divided forty-eight Federal Circuit indefiniteness opinions into 
four technology areas and reported that the claims at issue were held definite in the one 
biochemical case, in ten of fourteen chemical cases, in ten of sixteen electrical cases, and in 
eleven of seventeen other cases. Christa J. Laser, A Definite Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An 
Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and 
the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25, 35 tbl.4 (2010). Although 
a useful contribution, the small sample sizes do not really support the finding reported in her 
abstract that “the Federal Circuit more often held chemical claims not indefinite, but electrical 
claims indefinite.” Id. at 25. Indeed, the p-value for the observed difference between chemical 
and electrical cases is 0.61, meaning that even if there were no difference between the two 
groups of cases, there is a 61-percent chance that one would observe a difference in outcomes as 
large as the difference Laser observed simply due to random sampling error. Standard 
significance tests require p-values less than 0.05, or at least less than 0.10. David H. Kaye & 
David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 251 (3d ed. 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/SciMan3D01.pdf/$file/SciMan3D01.pdf [http://perma.cc/UX7X-7N6K] (“The 5% level 
[of statistical significance] is the most common in social science, and an analyst who speaks of 
significant results without specifying the threshold probably is using this figure.”). In another 
work, Dunstan Barnes examined 138 Federal Circuit opinions between 1997 and 2011 that 
reached the merits of a written-description or enablement issue. Dunstan H. Barnes, Note, 
Technically Speaking, Does It Matter? An Empirical Study Linking the Federal Circuit Judges’ 
Technical Backgrounds to How They Analyze the Section 112 Enablement and Written 
Description Requirements, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 971 (2013). He reported that for the forty 
biotechnology patents the invalidation rate was 62.5 percent and that for the ninety-eight other 
patents it was 58.2 percent. Id. at 1006. Barnes erroneously reported that this difference was 
“statistically significant (p < 0.05) under Pearson’s chi-squared test.” Id. The p-value under the 
chi-squared test is actually 0.64. 
 63. Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 9. 
 64. Id. at 70–88. 
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II.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Collection 
In this Article, we seek to test empirically the conventional 
wisdom that courts have applied § 112 requirements disparately 
across different technologies and industries. To do so, we collected all 
§ 112 decisions in the Westlaw database by district courts and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit between 1982, the year of 
the Federal Circuit’s creation, and July 2012.65 We began with an 
intentionally overinclusive dataset of all cases in which § 112 had 
been referred to in any way, and then we culled all cases that did not 
include an actual ruling on an accused infringer’s challenge to the 
validity of a utility patent asserted in litigation (including validity 
challenges by declaratory-judgment plaintiffs).66 We focused only on 
validity challenges in the litigation context; we did not include appeals 
from reexamination or reissue proceedings at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO). We included denials of summary judgment 
when these were the last-recorded decisions. Federal Circuit cases 
decided between July 2012 and September 10, 2014, were added to 
this collection.67 
We tried to achieve a complete census of reported § 112 
decisions during this period rather than taking a sample. Of course, 
not all decisions are reported in Westlaw; although its database 
includes many unpublished decisions, its coverage is slightly less 
comprehensive for district court cases and for older cases.68 But within 
 
 65. Had Lex Machina’s database of patent cases included those filed closer to the starting 
date of our desired population rather than starting in 2000, we would have preferred to use it as 
the source for district court decisions because it includes even those lawsuits that do not have a 
decision available on Westlaw. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra 
note 9, at 1772–73.  
 66. We only collected cases involving utility patents, the ordinary twenty-year patents for 
new inventions, and not design patents or plant patents. 
 67. We did not add more recent district court decisions because we could not be confident 
that appeals in these cases would be resolved by the time we began our analysis. Also note that 
four of the more recent Federal Circuit decisions were decided after the Supreme Court’s June 
2, 2014 decision on the definiteness requirement in Nautilus. In these four cases, the court 
rendered claim-definiteness decisions on seven patents. We decided to include these seven 
patent-case pairs in our dataset because the research question we sought to answer empirically 
is whether district courts and the Federal Circuit have over time applied the three section 112 
patentability requirements disparately across technologies and industries, irrespective of 
doctrinal changes in one of these requirements.  
 68. See E-mail from Tedd C., West Reference Attorney, to Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Asst. 
Prof. of Law, Stanford Law School (July 18, 2015, 6:41 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from 
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this limitation, we emphasize that our data set is a population, not a 
sample—a population of patents on which one of the three § 112 
issues was litigated to a merits decision reported in Westlaw between 
January 1, 1982, and July 31, 2012 (and up to September 10, 2014, for 
Federal Circuit cases). Thus we are not inferring things about a 
population from a sample drawn from that population. Any 
differences between technologies and industries in a population are 
significant by definition. We have, however, performed regression 
analyses and tests for statistical significance as though we were 
drawing inferences from a sample because many readers may seek to 
extrapolate these results to times outside our data set’s date 
parameters. Because we study a population, though, examining the 
coefficients in our results and noting both their direction and 
magnitude may be a useful exercise even when these coefficients are 
not statistically significant—any observed differences in a population 
are real ones. 
Figure 1 displays the size of our dataset by year. Because 
multiple patents are often asserted in a single case, and the same 
patent can be asserted in multiple cases, our basic unit of analysis may 
properly be referred to as a patent-case pair, of which we have 1144 in 
our dataset (with individual patents separated into groups of claims in 
the few cases for which courts reached different decisions on different 
claims within the same patent).69 
 
Scott S., West Reference Attorney, to Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Asst. Prof. of Law, Stanford 
Law School (July 19, 2015, 9:57 PM) (on file with author). 
 69. The few instances in which courts rendered different decisions for different claims 
within the same patent typically involved claim definiteness; in these instances, we created more 
than one row in our spreadsheet for the same patent. These additional decisions are counted 
within the total 1144 observations. 
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Figure 1. § 112 Patent-Case Pairs in Westlaw by Year (Total = 1144) 
 
B. Case Outcomes 
As noted above, our dataset contains 1144 patent-case pairs. 
Some patent-case pairs in our dataset include decisions on more than 
one of the three § 112 requirements for the same patent, so the total 
number of separate decisions is actually 1405. There are 433 decisions 
on enablement, 299 on written description, and 673 on claim 
definiteness. 
We coded the last-recorded merits decision in a case on any of 
the three § 112 issues. Thus, for example, a district court’s denial of 
the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment that the patent 
is invalid for lack of enablement because a fact issue remains is the 
decision we report if it is the last-recorded decision in the case, but if 
the patent is later found either valid or invalid under § 112 at trial, we 
do not report the earlier decision on summary judgment.70 The same 
 
 70. If a court rejects a section 112 invalidity argument but the patent is invalidated on other 









All District and Appellate Cases
District Cases to July 2012; Federal Circuit Cases to Sept. 2014
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logic applies to other situations, so that when the last decision on 
record is by the Federal Circuit, we do not record the trial court’s last 
decision on the same issue. Our dataset does not include Federal 
Circuit summary affirmances without opinion, but the district court 
decision being affirmed will be in our dataset as long as it is reported, 
which will typically be the case.71 
Determining exactly what an “outcome” is when empirically 
studying litigation, particularly patent litigation, is notoriously 
difficult. As noted, we seek to resolve one of the inherent difficulties 
by coding decisions at the level of a patent rather than at the level of 
a case. We seek to minimize yet another problem—what counts as a 
“win” on a legal issue when assembling data for statistical analysis—
by recording the relative strength of each decision on the following 
five-level ordinal scale: (1) invalid as a matter of law; (2) fact issue 
followed by a ruling of invalidity; (3) fact issue remaining; (4) fact 
issue followed by a ruling of validity; or (5) valid as a matter of law. 
(Technically, a patent is found “not invalid” rather than “valid,”72 but 
for simplicity we will refer to rulings of validity.) 
We also created a coarser one-to-three scale by collapsing “as a 
matter of law” and “fact issue followed by a validity or invalidity 
ruling” to produce “total valid” and “total invalid” outcomes on each 
of the three issues. Thus, our three-level scale in ascending order of 
decision strength in the patent owner’s favor is (1) invalid, (2) fact 
issue remaining, and (3) valid (not invalid). 
We coded a decision as one made as a matter of law, whether for 
validity or invalidity, if a district court granted summary judgment or 
pre- or postverdict judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issue 
at hand or ruled on an indefiniteness argument as a matter of law in a 
claim-construction order. On appeal, the decision was recorded as 
one made as a matter of law if the Federal Circuit either affirmed or 
reversed the decision below as a matter of law. We coded a decision 
as “fact issue followed by a ruling of validity or invalidity” when a 
 
 71. Under Rule 36, the Federal Circuit “may enter a judgment of affirmance without 
opinion” when the judgment below is supported by the record. Fed. Cir. R. 36. The Federal 
Circuit is thus unlikely to use Rule 36 when the decision below was so cursory as to be excluded 
from Westlaw. 
 72. “Valid” means “not invalid” because the court’s ruling is merely that the challenger has 
not met its burden of proving invalidity. The validity of the same patent can again be contested 
by another challenger, although a final ruling of invalidity kills the patent from then on. The 
situation has been referred to as “non-mutual collateral estoppel.” See In re Trans Tex. 
Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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district court allowed an issue to go to trial because a genuine issue of 
fact was involved and then found the patent valid or invalid on the 
issue in question in a bench trial, or granted a judgment of validity or 
invalidity in accordance with a jury’s verdict. On appeal, the decision 
was recorded as such when the Federal Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s decision of “fact issue followed by a ruling of validity or 
invalidity.” A decision was coded as “fact issue remaining” if the last-
reported decision in a district court case was a denial of a motion for 
summary judgment or preverdict JMOL. On appeal, a decision was so 
recorded when the last-reported decision was the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal and remand of a district court’s grant of summary judgment 
or preverdict JMOL. 
Because our collection of district court cases ended with 
decisions as of July 31, 2012, and our coding of outcomes did not 
begin until September 2014, we were able to use Westlaw’s KeyCite 
“flag” service to update those decisions, thus adding some certainty 
that the decisions we recorded were the last ones in the case. We used 
the flag service to update all Federal Circuit decisions as well. It is 
thus highly likely that when the last-reported decision was “fact issue 
remaining,” the parties had reached a settlement. 
C. Technology and Industry Classifications 
The heart of this Article is our comparison of nuanced outcomes 
on the issues of enablement, written description, and claim 
definiteness across the technology and industry categories of the 
asserted patents. Our technology categories refer to the nature of the 
invention itself, while our industry categories focus on the owner of 
the patents and the industry in which the technology is put to use. In 
one instance, biotechnology, we use the same term to describe both a 
technology and an industry; a patent on a gene sequence used in gene 
therapy is both a biotech technology and is used in the biotech 
industry. The two are not, however, identical. About half of the 
patents covering biotechnology techniques, that is, biotech as a 
technology, were assigned either to the medical industry because the 
patented technology’s covered use was for medical diagnostics and 
other medical techniques, or to the pharmaceutical industry because 
the technology produced a covered pharmaceutical drug. 
As another example, some patents that cover software 
technology are employed in traditional software industries like 
computers and other electronics, but software as a technology also 
shows up in a wide array of other industries, including 
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transportation/automotive, consumer goods, industrial goods, energy, 
medical devices/methods, and others. 
Although the PTO has a technology-classification scheme, it was 
not created for the purpose of defining technologies at a conceptual 
level73 and possesses other serious shortcomings, as one of us has 
discussed in prior work.74 Instead, we evaluated each of the patents in 
our study by hand and categorized them into one of six different 
technology areas and one of eleven different industry categories. 
With minor revisions, these are the same technology and industry 
categories developed by one of the current authors for a number of 
previous studies.75 
1. Technologies.  When determining the technology area to which 
an invention should be assigned, we focused on the claims, because 
the invention is most precisely described therein. When a patent 
owner sues for infringement, the allegation is that the defendant has 
made, used, or sold a product (or machine, composition of matter, or 
process) that performs all of the functions specified in one or more 
designated claims in the patent. To determine exactly what the patent 
covers and to which technology area it belongs, one must therefore 
study the language of the claims. Do the claims exclusively, or at least 
primarily, refer to mechanical elements, or do they refer to electrical, 
chemical, data-processing, or optical elements? The written 
description and drawings (the specification) are in a patent for the 
purpose of clarifying claim language, and for teaching a person having 
ordinary skill in the “art” (the technical field) how to make and use 
the invention. Consequently, when necessary to fully understand a 
 
 73. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (USPC), at I-1, I-3 (Dec. 2012), http://uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
patents/resources/classification/overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4LW-GLDM] (“The [U.S. 
Patent Classification System] serves both to facilitate the efficient retrieval of related technical 
documents and to route patent applications within the USPTO for examination.”). 
 74. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & Derek Trunkey, 
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 472 (2004) (“Because they are designed to assist in narrowly-
tailored prior art searches, the government’s classifications focus on the functional rather than 
the conceptual and do so at very low levels of abstraction.”). When a researcher works with an 
extremely large dataset such that it is not feasible to study each patent in depth as was done 
here, reliance on PTO classifications or International Patent Classifications (IPCs, which the 
PTO assigns from a concordance based on the PTO’s own classifications) may be an 
unavoidable shortcut.  
 75. For the two most recent papers using these technology and industry areas, see generally 
Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 9; and Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, supra note 9. 
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term in a patent claim, we resorted first to the specification. 
Occasionally, we also consulted technical dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
and the Internet to ensure that our understanding was correct. We 
first assigned each patent in our dataset to a single, primary 
technology area. For approximately one-sixth of the patents, we also 
identified one (or, rarely, two or more) secondary technology areas 
when another technology area clearly formed a secondary but 
nonetheless essential part of a claim or claims in the patent.76 When 
only primary technology areas are counted, we made the same 
 
 76. One example is Air Flow System for Common Cavity Microwave Oven, U.S. Patent 
No. 4,028,520 (filed Feb. 26, 1976), which primarily covers the mechanical structure of a 
microwave oven. ’520 Patent. The claim language also covers the control means, however, which 
is either electrical circuitry or an integrated circuit, which are electrical elements. ’520 Patent. 
We classified the patent as being in the primary mechanical-technology and secondary 
electrical-technology areas. (If the control means covers an integrated circuit, there is no claim 
language covering the manipulation of data—data processing—and thus software is not a proper 
secondary technology category.) 
  A second example is Odor Control Device, U.S. Patent No. 4,830,791 (filed Feb. 29, 
1988). Within this patent, Claim 1 reads: 
1. An improved odor control device including a basic support structure, power means, 
means for creating air-movement driven by said power means, a source of 
deodorizing olfactory stimulating means, means for determining the operation of said 
means for creating air-movement whereby the status of operability of said power 
means can be ascertained, means for determining a predetermined life span based on 
the operation of said device, the normal life of said deodorizing olfactory stimulating 
means being substantially equal to said predetermined life span, wherein said means 
for determining said predetermined life span includes a timer, a separate power 
source for driving said timer, said timer generating periodic pulses at predetermined 
intervals, a counter means accepting said periodic pulses, said counter means 
generating a latch signal upon receipt of a predetermined number of periodic pulses, 
signal means activated by said latch signal for notifying the user of said odor control 
device of the need for replacement of said deodorizing olfactory stimulating means. 
’791 Patent, col. 5 l. 65 to col. 6 l. 16. 
  Because the claim includes several means-plus-function elements, it was necessary to 
study the written description for the purpose of ascertaining exactly which means were used to 
accomplish the stated functions. Combining the claim language and the explanations in the 
written description, one can see that the claimed invention, an improved deodorizer for urinals 
in public restrooms, consisted primarily of electrical elements, including “state of the art 
[electrical] circuitry,” a timer, and a motor. ’791 Patent. Claim 4 for the odor-control invention, 
however, described a  
means for permitting operation of said device only when subjected to a light source 
includes a light sensing device having the capability of providing an off or an on 
signal, respectively, in the absence or presence of a light source, means for amplifying 
the signal from said light sensing device connected to said power source and to said 
motor, thereby conserving the power source for use only when said light sensing 
device is subjected to light as when someone turns on a light in an enclosed room 
wherein said odor control device is located. 
’791 Patent, col. 6 ll. 28–39. In other words, the invention was primarily electrical in nature, but 
with a secondary but critical optical element—the light sensor that conserved power by turning 
the electrical device on and off when light was present or not. Thus, we assigned the patent to 
primary electrical and secondary optical-technology classifications.  
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number of observations (1144) as the number of patent-case pairs. 
When both primary and secondary technology areas are included, the 
1144 patent-case pairs included a total of 1330 technology areas for an 
average of 1.16 technology areas per patent-case pair. The six primary 
technology areas are thus mutually exclusive, while the primary-plus-
secondary areas are not. The technology areas are defined as follows: 
(1) Mechanical: An invention in which the claims cover the use 
of mechanical parts, either solely or predominantly, sometimes 
combined with heat, hydraulics, pneumatics, or other power sources 
or power transfer techniques. 
(2) Electrical: An invention in which the claims cover the use of 
traditional electrical circuitry, or the storage or transmission of 
electric energy. 
(3) Chemistry: An invention in which the claims cover chemical 
reactions, chemical compounds with specific elements and 
proportions, and chemical processes specifying specific elements and 
amounts or proportions. Closely related inventions such as those on 
purportedly novel metal alloys and nonmetallic composites are also 
included when the claims cover the specific components and 
proportions of such amalgams. This technology area includes “small-
molecule” chemistry; DNA, antibodies, and other large molecules are 
included in the biotechnology category instead. Although many of the 
chemistry-technology patents were assigned to the pharmaceutical-
industry category, they are also found in other industry categories 
such as semiconductors. 
(4) Biotechnology: An invention in which the claims cover 
processes involving advanced genetic techniques intended to 
construct new microbial, plant, or animal strains; a product created 
from such a process; or the way such a process or product is used in 
biotechnology research.77 Although a number of different genetic-
 
 77. We also employ the term “biotechnology” to describe an industry in which the term 
seems to us to be the most accurate one in each case. As used here (to describe a technology) 
we are only concerned with scientific technique, and not with how the results of the scientific 
technique are ultimately employed. The scientific techniques of biotechnology can be employed 
in different industries. First, many of the patents assigned to biotechnology as a technology 
category find their way into the pharmaceutical-industry category, which is discussed below. 
This occurs when the result employing the scientific techniques of biotechnology (the 
technology) is a therapeutic drug. Second, when the technology of biotechnology produces a 
means for diagnosing a disease or disease propensity, however, the patent is properly assigned 
to a “medical” industry category. Finally, when a patent with a technology classification of 
biotechnology represents an advance in the science of biotechnology itself, its proper industry 
home is biotechnology.  
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engineering techniques exist, for several reasons we decided not to 
separate these techniques into distinct technology areas. 
(5) Software: An invention in which the claims cover data 
processing—the actual manipulation of data (and not merely 
transmission, receipt, or storage of data), regardless of whether the 
code carrying out such data processing is on a magnetic storage 
medium, embedded in a chip (“firmware”), or resident in flash 
memory. 
We also assigned certain patents in the “primary” software 
classification to one of that technology’s subsets, namely, software 
business methods. As we defined it, the software-business-method 
category includes software patents that cover models, methods, and 
techniques for conducting business transactions. Business-method 
patents are notoriously difficult to define, with possible definitions 
varying greatly in scope. For this study, we used a narrow definition 
limited to patents claiming automated generation of customer 
proposals, advertising, financial techniques, the use of online catalogs, 
and so on.78 We do not include computer-controlled manufacturing 
methods in the business-method category because they are not 
customarily viewed as being within the definition of a business-
method patent, although a broad definition could contain them. 
(6) Optics: An invention in which the claims cover the use of 
light waves or light energy. 
 
 78. An example is Billing System, U.S. Patent No. 5,287,270 (filed Dec. 2, 1992). Self-
explanatory claim 1 in this early business-method patent states: 
1. A system for presenting information concerning the actual cost of a service 
provided to a user by a service provider, said system comprising: storage means for 
storing individual transaction records prepared by said service provider, said 
transaction records relating to individual service transactions for one or more service 
customers including said user, and the exact charges actually billed to said user by 
said service provider for each said service transaction; data processing means 
comprising respective computation hardware means and respective software 
programming means for directing the activities of said computation hardware means; 
means for transferring at least a part of said individual transaction records from said 
storage means to said data processing means; said data processing means generating 
preprocessed summary reports as specified by the user from said individual 
transaction records transferred from said storage means and organizing said summary 
reports into a format for storage, manipulation and display on a personal computer 
data processing means; means for transferring said individual transaction records 
including said summary reports from said data processing means to said personal 
computer data processing means; and said personal computer data processing means 
being adapted to perform additional processing on said individual transaction records 
which have been at least in part preprocessed by said data processing means utilizing 
said summary reports for expedited retrieval of data, to present a subset of said 
selected records including said exact charges actually billed to said user. 
’270 Patent col. 31 l. 39 to col. 32 l. 6.  
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The numbers of observations across primary technology areas 
only are reported in Figure 2, which divides the software category 
into non-business-methods software (that is, more traditional 
software) and business methods. In our statistical analyses, we report 
on software as a whole (325 observations) compared with other 
primary technology areas, and then we calculate separate statistics 
with software divided into its two subsets, non-business-methods 
software (241 observations) and business methods (84 observations). 
Figure 3 reports the number of observations across primary- plus 
secondary-technology areas combined. 
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Figure 2. Observations Across Primary Technology Areas (Software 
Shown Both Combined and Divided into Nonbusiness Methods and 
Business Methods) (Total = 1144) 
 
Figure 3. Observations Across Primary and Secondary Technology 
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2. Industries.  Unlike technology areas, the industry categories 
focus more attention on the business use of the patent than on the 
nature of the technology itself. Although we paid attention to the 
claim language in assigning a patent to one of eleven mutually 
exclusive industry categories, we found it necessary to focus more 
attention on the written description and on extrinsic evidence, 
especially Internet sources. 
(1) Computer and Other Electronics: This industry encompasses 
inventions that purport to advance the state of the art in computing or 
computer-device manufacturing, or to enhance users’ experiences in 
using computing technology. The category includes software and 
computer hardware, as well as inventions for which the advance 
involves traditional electrical circuitry. Most patents in this industry 
category fall in the electrical- or software-technology categories, but 
the mechanical and optics technologies are also represented. We 
combine the computer and traditional electronics industries because 
the industries clearly have been merging, with fewer and fewer 
patents covering traditional electronics and not also including data-
processing elements. 
(2) Semiconductor: The semiconductor-industry category 
includes inventions intended to advance the state of the art in 
researching, designing, or fabricating semiconductor chips. All 
technology areas except biotechnology are represented in this 
industry category. 
(3) Pharmaceutical: The pharmaceutical-industry category 
includes patents on drugs for treating diseases or other abnormal 
conditions in humans or animals, as well as processes for producing or 
using such drugs. The technologies found in pharmaceutical-industry 
inventions are overwhelmingly chemistry or biotechnology. We also 
divide the broad pharmaceutical-industry category into subcategories 
for (a) patent-case pairs in which the litigation was triggered by a 
generic drug manufacturer’s filing of an ANDA under the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 198479 and (b) those in which the litigation was not 
triggered by an ANDA filing.80 We run some regressions using the 
 
 79. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 35 
U.S.C.). 
 80. There are many examples of claims from pharmaceutical patents involved in ANDA 
litigation. See generally, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., Nos. 04-1689, 06-
757, 2006 WL 2865469 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2006) (granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 
judgment on defendant’s section 112 invalidity defenses); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
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pharmaceutical-industry category as a whole and others in which 
ANDA and non-ANDA cases are treated as separate industry 
categories. 
(4) Biotechnology: This category includes those inventions that 
are in the biotechnology technology category that do not relate to the 
production of pharmaceutical compositions or medical diagnostics or 
treatment, but that instead purport to advance the science of 
biotechnology itself. 
(5) Medical Devices, Methods, and Other Medical: This industry 
category includes any inventions for research on, or for the diagnosis 
or treatment of, diseases or other abnormal conditions in humans or 
animals, excluding those that are assigned to the pharmaceutical- and 
biotechnology-industry categories. Thus, this category does not 
include patents on processes or products for pharmaceutical purposes 
or patents using biotechnology techniques to advance the science of 
biotechnology without direct medical applications. All of the different 
technology fields are represented in the medical-industry category. 
(6) Communications: The communications-industry category 
includes inventions in any technology—including software, electrical, 
optics, and mechanical—that advance the state of the art in 
communications. Software inventions pertaining solely to the 
technical aspects of communication within a computer network are 
not included within this industry category, and are placed instead in 
the computer-and-other-electronics classification. 
(7) Transportation (Including Automotive): This category 
includes patents related to the production of automobiles, trucks, 
aircraft, and other vehicles of any kind intended for transporting 
people or cargo, as well as inventions related to the provision of 
 
Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of validity and denying defendant’s cross-motion on issues of invalidity, 
including indefiniteness under section 112, and noninfringement); Imperial Chem. Indus. PLC v. 
Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1991) (holding patent invalid on grounds of 
obviousness and failure to include an adequate disclosure under section 112). 
  There are also many examples of those patents assigned to the pharmaceutical-industry 
category, the litigation of which were not triggered by an ANDA filing. See generally N. Am. 
Vaccine Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Oakwood Labs. v. Tap Pharm. 
Prods., Inc., No. 01 C 7631, 2003 WL 22400759 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2003); Liposome Co. v. Vestar 
Inc., No. 92-332-RRM, 1994 WL 738952 (D. Del. Dec. 20, 1994). However, litigation over 
pharmaceutical compositions are not always triggered by ANDA filings. For one example of a 
patent on a pharmaceutical-drug composition for which a § 112 issue was litigated in a case not 
resulting from an ANDA filing, see generally Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
No. 99-922(DRD), 2007 WL 4233015 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2007). 
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transportation services. The mechanical-, electrical-, chemistry-, and 
software-technology areas are represented in this industry category. 
(8) Construction: The construction-industry category includes 
inventions of all kinds related to the erection or maintenance of 
structures or to excavation. 
(9) Energy: This category includes inventions of any kind 
associated with sources of energy and with power generation, 
transportation, or consumption. 
(10) Goods & Services for Consumer Uses: This category 
includes patents on products and services of all kinds intended for 
personal consumer purposes—that is, goods and services for retail 
uses that are not in another, more specific category. Some software-
implemented business-method inventions are included in this 
category. 
(11) Goods & Services for Industrial & Business Uses: This 
category includes patents on products and services of all kinds 
intended for industrial and business purposes—that is, goods and 
services for wholesale uses that are not in another, more specific 
category. Many software-implemented business-method inventions 
are included in this category. 
Figure 4 reports the numbers of observations in our eleven 
mutually exclusive industry categories, as well as the number of cases 
when the pharmaceutical industry is separated into ANDA-related 
cases and those not instigated by an ANDA filing. 
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Figure 4. Observations Across Industry Categories (Total = 1144) 
 
To help make this abstract discussion of coding patent-case pairs 
by outcome, technology, and industry more concrete, here is an 
example of a patent claim that was coded in our “mechanical” 
technology category and our “medical-device/methods” industry 
category. It illustrates the difficulty in precisely describing even a 
purely mechanical invention—here, an expandable coronary stent for 
use in angioplasty (“balloon surgery”): 
A stent having a patterned shape comprising: (a) even first meander 
patterns having axes extending in a first direction; (b) odd first 
meander patterns having axes extending in said first direction, 
wherein the odd first meander patterns are 180° out of phase with 
the even first meander patterns, the even first meander patterns and 
the odd first meander patterns alternating with and spaced from 
each other; (c) second meander patterns having axes extending in a 
second direction different from the first direction, the second 
meander patterns being interconnected with the even and odd first 
meander patterns to form a generally uniform distributed structure, 
(d) wherein the first and second meander patterns have loops, (e) 
wherein the even and odd first meander patterns are interconnected 
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between adjacent even and odd first meander patterns, (f) wherein 
the portions of the second meander patterns between adjacent even 
and odd first meander patterns are adapted to lengthen and to 
compensate for the tendency of the loops of the first meander 
patterns to foreshorten when the stent is expanded and (g) wherein 
the first and second meander patterns are interconnected to leave 
only two loops of each of the first meander patterns between each 
pair of second meander patterns.81 
Although this patent was not challenged on enablement or written-
description grounds, it was the subject of sharp disagreement over the 
alleged indefiniteness of a dozen different terms found in the above 
claim and several others, including “meander pattern,” “loop,” and 
others.82 After concluding that none of the disputed terms had a 
customary meaning and that the patent owner had chosen to be “its 
own lexicographer” (that is, had defined its own terms in the 
specification), the district court found all terms to be not indefinite as 
a matter of law.83 This patent-case pair was thus coded as a five on our 
five-level indefiniteness scale (and a three on the collapsed three-
level scale), and it does not factor into our enablement or written-
description results. 
D. Other Variables 
Out of our 1144 patent-case pairs, 191 involve inventions with a 
non-U.S. origin (reported in our regressions as “foreign origin”). 
Invention origin was determined based on where the majority of 
inventors resided, or, if there was no majority, a plurality. In unusual 
cases in which there was a tie between U.S. and non-U.S. inventor 
residences, the domicile of the assignee was used as a tiebreaker. As 
is typical, most but not all patents had an assignee at issuance. 
There are 146 patent-case pairs in which the patent has a non-
U.S.-priority filing (“foreign priority”) and 998 with a U.S.-priority 
filing. This variable and the “foreign-origin” variable are strongly 
positively correlated, as one would expect, but a number of patents in 
our dataset have different invention origins and priority filing 
countries (often for inventions that originated in Canada or Israel but 
 
 81. Flexible Expandable Stent, U.S. Patent No. 6,443,982 col. 7 ll. 18–47 (filed Jan. 21, 
2000). 
 82. Medinol Ltd. v. Guidant Corp., No. 03 Civ. 2604, 2004 WL 2210290, at *4–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 2004). 
 83. Id. 
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with applications that were first filed in the United States). Of the 146 
non-U.S. priority filings, the largest number were in the United 
Kingdom with thirty-eight, followed by Japan with twenty-six, 
Germany with twenty-two, France with sixteen, and Israel with 
eleven. 
Only thirty-six of our patent-case pairs included reissue patents; 
the remaining 1178 were regular utility patents.84 Our dataset includes 
354 appeals court decisions and 790 decisions from district courts.85 In 
addition, 1022 decisions in our study were rendered after the April 5, 
1995 date of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., whereas 122 were made before that date. We 
discuss this case briefly and how we control for its possible effects on 
our outcomes when we report and explain the regression results. 
We also coded for the federal district in which the case was filed. 
The three districts in which the largest number of cases were filed 
were the usual suspects: the District of Delaware (164), the Northern 
District of California (126), and the Eastern District of Texas (112). 
The top three districts had a substantially greater number of filings 
than the rest of the districts; the fourth busiest, the Northern District 
of Illinois, accounted for only sixty-six of the decisions. 
III.  RESULTS 
We first present the overall outcomes for the three § 112 
requirements, followed by a report and explanation of detailed 
descriptive results by technology and industry. After the discussion of 
descriptive results on technology comparisons, we present and discuss 
our regression findings and then repeat this order of presentation for 
industry comparisons. 
 
 84. If a patentee can prove that, because of a good faith mistake, it claimed either less than 
or more than its specification supported, it can apply for a reissue patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) 
(2012). A patent owner can seek a reissue patent with narrower claims at any time during the 
patent’s term of protection, but can only seek one with broader claims within two years after 
issuance of the original patent. Id. § 251(d). A reissue patent has only the term of protection 
that the original patent would have had. See id. § 251(a) (“[T]he Director shall . . . reissue the 
patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent . . . for the unexpired part of the term of 
the original patent.”). 
 85. Four early appellate decisions in our dataset were by regional circuit courts. We kept 
these in the dataset because we believed that any disparate application of section 112 
requirements would likely have been found in the early 1980s. 
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A. Overall Outcomes 
Figure 5 shows the number of cases with each outcome on our 
five-level scale for each of the § 112 doctrines of issue: enablement, 
written description, and claim definiteness. The most common cases 
are those in which the court rejected as a matter of law an argument 
that a claim was indefinite. This may be because courts have been less 
receptive to indefiniteness arguments, or it may reflect a reluctance to 
bring weaker enablement and written-description challenges, perhaps 
due to greater costs in raising these defenses. It will be interesting to 
see whether this will change in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Nautilus decision, discussed above.86 
Figure 5. Overall Outcomes 
 
 
B. Outcomes by Technology 
1. Scores on Ordinal Scales.  We present basic descriptive 
statistics showing mean scores, with standard deviations, across 
technologies and industries. These results are shown for both the five-
level and the coarser three-level scales. Lower numbers mean that 
more patents in that category were invalidated; higher numbers mean 
that more results favored the patentee. Both lower and higher scores 
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also reflect our distinction between decisions made as a matter of law 
and those made as a factual matter: decisions of invalidity as a matter 
of law push the overall score lower than those made only after factual 
determinations, and decisions of validity as a matter of law push the 
score higher than those made only after factual determinations.87 
These raw scores do not account for the influence of other factors; we 
add controls for numerous variables in our regression results. Table 1 
shows descriptive statistics by primary technology and issue, and 
Table 2 by primary-plus-secondary technology areas combined. 
Scores on the three-level scale follow the same pattern as the five-
level scale, so we focus here on the more fine-grained five-level scale; 
the coarser scale has its greatest utility later as a robustness check on 
the regression results. 








5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 
Mechanical 
N 137 137 88 88 195 195 
mean 3.85 2.54 3.40 2.34 4.36 2.73 
sd 1.14 0.71 1.34 0.79 1.27 0.64 
Electrical 
N 49 49 30 30 64 64 
mean 3.63 2.45 3.97 2.63 4.11 2.63 
sd 1.25 0.77 0.93 0.62 1.46 0.74 
Chemistry 
N 110 110 58 58 128 128 
mean 3.51 2.36 3.38 2.33 4.16 2.62 
sd 1.26 0.79 1.30 0.85 1.36 0.72 
Biotechnology 
N 44 44 40 40 30 30 
mean 3.34 2.30 3.15 2.15 4.30 2.70 
sd 1.29 0.85 1.46 0.86 1.39 0.70 
Software (All) 
N 73 73 74 74 235 235 
mean 2.92 1.86 2.96 2.03 3.88 2.45 
sd 1.26 0.81 1.41 0.79 1.72 0.87 
Software (Not 
BusMeth) 
N 60 60 50 50 173 173 
mean 2.82 1.80 3.12 2.16 3.97 2.50 
sd 1.24 0.82 1.41 0.79 1.64 0.83 
Software (BusMeth) 
N 13 13 24 24 62 62 
mean 3.39 2.15 2.63 1.75 3.61 2.31 
sd 1.26 0.69 1.38 0.74 1.90 0.95 
Optics 
N 20 20 9 9 21 21 
mean 3.10 2.15 3.22 2.11 4.24 2.67 
sd 1.33 0.81 0.97 0.78 1.45 0.73 
 
 87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining “valid” means “not invalid”). 
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The last two columns of Table 1 show that patents in the 
mechanical-, electrical-, chemistry-, biotechnology-, and optics-
technology fields were most likely to withstand claim-indefiniteness 
challenges, with software having fared less well, and software’s 
business-method subset being the most likely to be invalidated. Even 
software-implemented business methods, however, had an average 
score of well above three on our five-level scale, meaning that the 
average outcome was more favorable to the patent’s validity than 
“fact issue remaining.” The mean descriptive score on claim 
definiteness regardless of technology is a rather high 4.12, indicating 
that the average patent in our study contested for indefiniteness 
received a ruling above the level of “fact issue followed by a validity 
ruling.” The mean of the six technology means for definiteness is 4.74 
(which is higher than averaging over all patents because a greater 
numbers of patents in technology categories fared better against 
definiteness challenges). Across all technologies, patents were more 
likely to be invalidated on enablement and written description than 
on definiteness, with mean scores on the five-level scale of 3.49 and 
3.30, respectively. That is, the average patent challenged on 
enablement or written description received a ruling between “fact 
issue remaining” and “fact issue followed by a validity ruling,” with 
patents slightly more likely to survive enablement challenges. 
Although this difference is statistically significant, it is small and 
likely driven by the kinds of patents challenged under each doctrine. 
If instead of averaging over all patent-case pairs we take the average 
of the six technology means, the outcome is reversed: we get 3.39 for 
enablement and 3.46 for written description. 
On enablement, patents employing the oldest technology of all, 
mechanics, scored higher than those in any other primary technology 
area, and software scored the lowest. In the software area, it may 
come as a surprise that the non-business-method software patents 
were more likely to be invalidated than those covering business 
models and techniques.88 Unlike the rest of the software class, 
 
 88. This counterintuitive result accords with Michael Risch’s study comparing litigation 
outcomes for the most litigious nonpracticing entities with other randomly selected plaintiffs, 
which found that hardware-specific software patents performed worse than general-purpose 
software patents. See generally Risch, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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business methods were ranked almost as high as biotech and above 
optics in their likelihood to survive scrutiny.89 
On written description, patents in the electrical- and mechanical-
technology areas switched places, the former being the most likely to 
withstand challenges. The mean written-description outcome for 
software business methods was the worst mean outcome for any 
technology on any § 112 issue, meaning that software-business-
method patents were very likely to be invalidated for lack of written 
description. Non-business-method software and software as a whole 
also fared poorly on written description. Biotechnology 
underperformed the all-technology mean for written description and 
just barely outranked software as a whole and non-business-method 
software. Optics was next, followed in ascending order by chemistry 
and mechanical patents. 







5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 
Mechanical 
N 156 156 108 108 221 221 
mean 3.75 2.48 3.39 2.32 4.32 2.71 
Sd 1.22 0.75 1.37 0.81 1.30 0.67 
Electrical 
N 81 81 48 48 100 100 
mean 3.41 2.31 4.00 2.69 4.04 2.56 
Sd 1.29 0.79 0.88 0.59 1.55 0.80 
Chemistry 
N 114 114 61 61 135 135 
mean 3.52 2.38 3.39 2.34 4.16 2.62 
Sd 1.24 0.78 1.27 0.83 1.37 0.72 
Biotechnology 
N 44 44 40 40 30 30 
mean 3.34 2.30 3.15 2.15 4.30 2.70 
Sd 1.29 0.85 1.46 0.86 1.39 0.70 
Software 
N 85 85 81 81 252 252 
mean 3.01 1.93 3.01 2.06 3.93 2.48 
Sd 1.31 0.81 1.37 0.78 1.69 0.85 
Optics 
N 34 34 19 19 41 41 
mean 3.15 2.09 3.42 2.21 4.27 2.68 
Sd 1.31 0.79 1.35 0.79 1.36 0.69 
 
 89. Note that the mean scores are least reliable for optics and business methods because of 
the smaller numbers of observations. The standard errors of the means in each of these 
categories are about 0.3. 
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As would be expected, the scores across our primary and 
secondary technology fields combined reveal patterns quite similar to 
those found in the primary technology areas alone, with certain 
exceptions. Inventions employing mechanical technologies scored 
highest overall across the three § 112 issues. Most mechanical 
inventions involve structures and concepts that may be more easily 
grasped by lawyers, judges, and juries than inventions in other fields, 
which may contribute to the relatively greater degree of success when 
confronted with § 112 challenges of any kind. 
Mean five-level scores on the three § 112 patentability 
requirements combined provide a somewhat different lens through 
which to compare the six technology areas. In Table 3, we averaged 
the three mean scores from the five-level scale for each technology 
area, with the primary technology areas from Table 1 in the first 
column of means and the primary and secondary technology areas 
combined from Table 2 in the second column. When the three § 112 
issues are combined, electrical and mechanical patents fared the best, 
followed by chemistry, biotechnology, optics, and then software. 
 
Table 3: Mean Scores on Five-Level Scale Across All § 112 
Requirements Combined 
 
 Primary Technology 
Area 
Primary + Secondary 
Combined 
Electrical 3.90 3.82 
Mechanical 3.87 3.82 
Chemistry 3.68 3.69 
Biotechnology 3.60 3.60 
Optics 3.52 3.61 
Software (All) 3.25 3.32 
All-Tech Mean 3.64 3.64 
2. Regression Results by Technologies and Issues.  From a purely 
descriptive perspective, it appears that the average outcome courts 
reach on the § 112 requirements has varied across technology fields. 
Such a conclusion is premature, however, without using multiple 
regressions to test the significance of these differences while 
controlling for other factors that could have influenced the outcomes. 
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Table 4 presents summary regression findings for primary and 
secondary technology areas combined, and then primary areas alone, 
for each of enablement, written description, and claim definiteness. 
All regressions used the ordered logistic regression (or ordered logit) 
model,90 with standard errors calculated using the bootstrap method 
with clustering at both the patent and case levels.91 
Each of the columns in the table reveals the results of a separate 
ordered logit regression, which includes as independent variables not 
only the technology area but also several other variables that could 
possibly influence the outcomes.92 Only outcomes measured by the 
 
 90. We used ordered logistic regression models because each of our dependent variables 
(specific outcomes on each of the three issues) is ordinal, with ordered values (ranging from one 
to three or one to five for the two different coding schemes) indicating the strength of the 
outcomes in favor of patent validity. See generally J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, 
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 186–88 (2d 
ed. 2005) (describing the appropriate application of ordered logit models). We used the Stata 
statistical-analysis software package. 
 91. We clustered on the standard errors of both patents and cases simultaneously because 
(1) observations coded from the same patent litigated in multiple cases are likely to be 
correlated and (2) observations coded from multiple patents litigated in the same case are also 
likely to possess a degree of interdependence, given that the same decisionmaker rules on these 
patents and some of the patents asserted in the same case typically have come from the same 
original patent application. Any interdependence among separate observations causes them to 
convey less new information than if they were completely independent. Standard-error 
clustering is an accepted technique for use when the assumption of observational independence 
does not hold, as in many empirical studies of patent-infringement litigation. See id. at 85–86;  
A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference with Multi-way 
Clustering 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Tech. Working Paper No. 327, 2006), http://
www.nber.org/papers/t0327.pdf [http://perma.cc/6F7F-7Q3K]. 
  The bootstrap method provides an accurate estimate of standard errors when the 
underlying distribution is unknown by running the regression on random samples of the data 
many times. See LONG & FREESE, supra note 90, at 127. For example, for each regression on 
enablement, we had 433 observations, divided into clusters by patent number. Stata’s 
bootstrapping procedure first took a random sample of 433 observations from the original set 
based on drawing cluster units with replacement (so that observations on the same patent are 
always drawn together). The resulting random sample is not identical to the original 433-
observation sample because the randomness of the sample will miss some of the observations 
and duplicate others. Stata then ran the ordered logistic regression on the random sample. This 
process of drawing a new random sample and running the regression was repeated 1000 times. 
The coefficients from the 1000 regressions were used to derive a final p-value and standard 
error for each coefficient. We followed the same procedure separately for the written-
description and claim-definiteness issues, the size of each resampling being the number of 
observations for that particular issue (that is, 299 and 673, respectively). Also, separate 
regressions using identical techniques were run for the five-level and three-level models on each 
issue. 
 92. More detailed regression findings are reported in the Appendix, including the results 
from our use of “parsimonious” models without the controls we report in the body of this 
Article, as well as other ordered logit results at a finer level. There were few changes in the 
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five-level scale are reported in Table 4; outcomes on the coarser 
three-level scale are included in the Appendix along with other more 
detailed findings. 
We also used a linear probability model on a binary “valid” or 
“invalid” outcome variable, which was created by omitting the “fact 
issue remaining” category from the three-level outcome variable. The 
results of this set of regressions on the three § 112 issues are reported 
in the Appendix in Tables A10 and A11. These results are generally 
consistent with our more fine-grained measures. 
In addition to regression results for specific technology areas and 
industry categories, Appendix tables report the results of F-tests for 
joint technology effects and joint industry effects, that is, whether 
technology area or industry category matters overall.93 
In Table 4, coefficients appear first; in parentheses just below 
each coefficient is the corresponding p-value, which indicates how 
statistically significant the results are.94 For example, p=0.05 indicates 
that if there were only random differences between patents in that 
category and in the comparison group, there is only a 5-percent 
chance that one would find an effect as large as the one observed.95 A 
statistically significant result simply indicates that there is likely a 
nonrandom difference between that group of patents and other 
patents in the sample. (But note that even if the data are random, one 
would expect to observe statistically significant relationships at the 
p=0.05 level one in twenty times, so erroneous findings of significance 
are inevitable when testing a large number of relationships.) 
Statistical significance says nothing about whether the difference 
between that group of patents and others in the sample is large or 
practically significant. To draw those conclusions, it is necessary to 
examine the magnitude of the coefficients.96 In our regressions, 
 
magnitude or statistical significance of coefficients for technologies or industries between the 
parsimonious models and ones with the added controls.  
 93. More formally, this is a test of the null hypothesis that none of the technology or 
industry variables have predictive power. 
 94. Standard errors for all coefficients are in our files. Because the standard error can be 
easily calculated from the coefficient and the p-value, we chose to not report them separately in 
this Article. 
 95. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 62, at 303, 320. 
 96. The coefficients are actually log-likelihood ratios. For a basic overview of 
interpretation of ordered logistic regression coefficients, see Stata Annotated Output: Ordered 
Logistic Regression, UCLA INST. FOR DIG. RESEARCH & EDUC., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/
stata/output/stata_ologit_output.htm [http://perma.cc/B34V-9CXY].  
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positive coefficients indicate that patents in that category were more 
likely to survive validity challenge than the unreported “comparison 
dummy”—which, for technology variables, means patents in the 
optics-technology category. Negative coefficients indicate that patents 
in that category fared less well. Comparing coefficients for two 
reported technologies indicates how they fared relative to each other. 
Note that the relative ordering of the coefficients will not change 
depending on which is chosen as the comparison group, but their 
statistical significance—which is measured relative to the comparison 
group—may change. After Table 4, we explain these results in detail, 
including the independent variables we introduced as controls for the 
influence of factors other than just the technology areas. We later do 
the same for industries. 
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Table 4. Ordered Logit Five-Level Outcomes by Technology Field 
 
Enablement Written Description Claim Definiteness 
Combined Primary Combined Primary Combined Primary 
Mechanical 
0.368 1.099** 0.176 0.370 0.259 0.0406 
(0.270) (0.0195) (0.646) (0.513) (0.512) (0.957) 
Electrical 
-0.0559 0.864* 1.221*** 1.217** -0.0525 -0.180 
(0.856) (0.0873) (0.000990) (0.0416) (0.874) (0.820) 
Chemistry 
-0.0850 0.616 0.0934 0.212 -0.0337 -0.284 
(0.816) (0.196) (0.827) (0.710) (0.937) (0.710) 
Biotechnology 
-0.141 0.556 0.0386 0.182 0.382 0.125 
(0.741) (0.293) (0.938) (0.765) (0.506) (0.882) 
Software 
(BusMeth) 
-0.246 0.475 -0.842 -0.727 -0.138 -0.407 
(0.709) (0.554) (0.183) (0.280) (0.787) (0.621) 
Software (Not 
BusMeth) 
-1.002*** -0.469 -0.269 0.0677 0.326 -0.0290 
(0.00411) (0.396) (0.457) (0.910) (0.418) (0.970) 
MPF Claim 





-0.309 -0.260 0.908 0.926 0.376 0.378 
(0.516) (0.591) (0.281) (0.159) (0.764) (0.747) 
Declaratory 
Judgment 
0.110 0.137 0.318 0.196 -0.275 -0.283 
(0.682) (0.591) (0.457) (0.623) (0.300) (0.297) 
District Court 
Decision 
0.662*** 0.647*** 0.101 0.0711 0.475** 0.483** 
(0.00494) (0.00445) (0.682) (0.774) (0.0196) (0.0220) 
Foreign 
Origin 
1.041 1.000 0.0489 0.281 1.460 1.443 
(0.153) (0.170) (0.906) (0.477) (0.358) (0.501) 
Foreign 
Priority 
-0.441 -0.367 0.467 0.176 -1.872 -1.831 
(0.583) (0.640) (0.338) (0.716) (0.239) (0.395) 
Post-
Markman 
-0.286 -0.278 0.134 0.176 0.660*** 0.686*** 
(0.262) (0.259) (0.654) (0.567) (0.00596) (0.00457) 
E.D. Tex. 
-0.688 -0.679 -0.394 -0.0847 -0.147 -0.0820 
(0.213) (0.216) (0.527) (0.894) (0.683) (0.806) 
N.D. Cal. 
-0.328 -0.344 -0.208 -0.281 0.411 0.398 
(0.248) (0.213) (0.546) (0.417) (0.202) (0.215) 
D. Del. 
-0.160 -0.189 0.376 0.309 -0.175 -0.168 
(0.540) (0.492) (0.209) (0.292) (0.452) (0.476) 
N 433 433 299 299 673 673 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. More 
positive coefficients mean patents were more likely to be held not invalid. 
 
Confirming the descriptive results we observed, patents on 
inventions in the primary mechanical-technology area performed 
significantly better than other areas in withstanding enablement 
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challenges in reported decisions (p<0.05), although primary-plus-
secondary technology areas combined revealed no such advantage 
over other combined fields. 
Again in agreement with the descriptive results, electrical patents 
had significant comparative strength on written description in the 
primary technology areas (p<0.05), and highly significant comparative 
strength in primary-plus-secondary areas combined (p<0.00l). Patents 
in the primary electrical-technology field, but not primary-plus-
secondary, also performed better than those in other primary 
technology areas on enablement, but only at a p<0.10 level.97 
Interestingly, we found no significant differences for either the 
chemistry or biotechnology areas on any of the disclosure or 
definiteness requirements. Surprisingly, the same was true for 
business-methods software patents, but patents on more traditional 
software inventions that were not business methods showed highly 
significant weakness on enablement, at least when primary and 
secondary technology areas were combined (p<0.01). The inventions 
assigned to the secondary software non-business-methods-technology 
class apparently happened to have been paired with those that did 
poorly on enablement in other primary technology fields. 
As controls on the regression results for outcomes on the three 
§ 112 issues by technology, we included the following variables:98 
a. Whether the claim element at issue was in means-plus-function 
(MPF) format.  Such format is one in which the drafter merely 
claimed a “means” for achieving a specified function without also 
claiming any corresponding structure or steps for accomplishing the 
 
 97. When data contain high levels of noise in the form of undiscoverable or unmeasurable 
explanatory variables, which is surely true of data on specific litigation outcomes such as ours, it 
may be worth noting a finding at even this marginal level of significance. 
 98. We could have controlled for a number of other potential influences, such as number of 
citations received by the patents, numbers of prior-art references in the patents, ages of the time 
of litigation filing, and others. Given the size of our dataset, we were limited in how many 
variables we could test in a regression model. Previous research by one of us revealed that 
patent characteristics, such as numbers of citations received by patents in the dataset and total 
numbers of references to the prior art, had little discernible influence on specific litigation 
outcomes. Patent and litigation characteristics also did little to explain very specific litigation 
outcomes; that is, the “pseudo-R-squareds” of those regression models (reflecting the 
explanatory power of all of the independent variables combined on specific litigation outcomes) 
were very small. See Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1799–
1800. The pseudo-R-squareds for the ordered logit models in the present Article are also small, 
confirming that it is very difficult to explain or predict litigation outcomes at a highly specific 
level because of many influences on those outcomes that are undiscoverable or unmeasurable. 
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function. Thus, “means for transforming a toad into a charming 
prince” is drafted in MPF format. Under § 112(f) (formerly § 112 ¶ 6), 
MPF claims are allowed only if the structure required for 
accomplishing that function is clearly described in the specification.99 
If a litigant argues that a disputed claim term is in MPF format, the 
district court must first determine whether this is true—does the claim 
element identify only an unspecified means for performing a stated 
function? By definition, an MPF claim element contains no structure 
or steps for accomplishing the specified function. If a claim element is 
in MPF format, the court must then determine whether the claimed 
function is adequately supported in the specification by the clear 
expression of some type of structure, whether that structure is an 
electrical circuit, a seal to prevent impurities from intruding into a 
cylinder that contains a piston, or an algorithm for accomplishing a 
data-processing function. This requirement is important to our study 
because a claim-definiteness issue is inherent in any decision finding 
that a claim element is in MPF format, because an MPF claim without 
a description of sufficient structure in the specification requires a 
finding of claim indefiniteness under § 112(b).100 We thus include this 
variable as a control, but only in the ordered logit models for the 
claim-definiteness issue.101 The negative and very highly significant 
coefficients for both primary and primary-plus-secondary technology 
field comparisons reveal that a claim with an MPF element was far 
more likely to succumb to an indefiniteness challenge (p<0.001). One 
might think that this result is driven by recent software-patent cases 
following the Federal Circuit’s 2008 decision in Aristrocrat, which 
embraced the use of indefiniteness to invalidate overbroad MPF 
software claims.102 However, we reran these regressions with all 
software patents removed from the dataset, and again with an 
additional restriction to pre-2008 decisions, and in each case we found 
 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed 
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, 
or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding 
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). 
 100. Id. § 112(b); see Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 101. There is a large body of literature on MPF claims, including much analysis of whether 
courts have adopted the correct approach in determining whether a claim element is in MPF 
format in the first place. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 53, at 949–64. The subject is, of course, 
quite beyond the scope of this Article.  
 102. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2008).  
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the same negative and highly significant coefficients on the MPF 
variable. We thus think this is not an Aristocrat-specific result. 
b. Whether the patent was a reissue.  Because the granting of a 
petition for a reissue patent requires the patent owner to surrender 
the original patent, thus leaving it vulnerable to any objection to its 
continued validity by the PTO, one may naturally wonder whether a 
patent emerging from this process might be less susceptible to validity 
challenges in later litigation. We thus identified all reissue patents in 
our dataset, and included its status as a reissue as a control in our 
regression models. As an independent variable, it showed no 
significant effect on any of the three § 112 issues in any technology 
field. 
c. Whether the case was initiated as a declaratory-judgment action.  
Prior research by one of us revealed that accused infringers fare 
significantly better on several issues in patent litigation when they 
initiate the action by filing for a declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement and invalidity, even after controlling for any effects 
that may have been caused by the ability to choose which federal 
district in which to institute the action.103 Because of this evidence, we 
controlled here for who filed the action first. The coefficient on this 
control variable was not statistically significant in any of our 
technology regressions, although lack of a finding of significance does 
not indicate the absence of an effect—just that we cannot statistically 
demonstrate such an effect with this dataset. The prior study and the 
present one had fundamentally different goals, datasets, outcomes 
studied, and coding schemes.104 Thus, whether “who goes first” makes 
a real difference in outcomes remains a viable question for further 
research. 
d. Whether the last decision was rendered by a district court.  
Identifying those cases in which the last decision was made by a 
district court gives an opportunity to examine whether district courts 
 
 103. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1798 (finding these 
results after studying specific litigation outcomes using a dataset of 949 patent-case pairs for 
cases filed during 2008 and 2009 resulting in a merits outcome by the end of 2013).  
 104. The prior study used a database including only cases filed in 2008 and 2009 that 
resulted in merits decisions by the end of 2013, examined outcomes on far more issues in 
addition to overall case outcomes, separately coded decisions at all procedural levels, and coded 
each outcome in a different manner. See id. at 1772–76; see also supra note 15. 
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as a group or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit display 
noticeably different tendencies when deciding disclosure and 
definiteness issues. Some have asserted that the Federal Circuit 
possesses a pro-patent bias leading it to hold patents to be valid with 
greater regularity than the district courts that it supervises.105 For the 
decisions in our dataset, however, we found the reverse to be true for 
enablement and definiteness. Our regression results show that, while 
taking into account the effects of technologies and the other control 
variables described here, district courts as a group were more likely to 
uphold patents in the face of an enablement challenge with a high 
degree of significance (p<0.01) and more likely to find patents valid in 
the face of an indefiniteness allegation at a significant level (p<0.05). 
These p-values were for either primary technology fields alone or 
primary-plus-secondary technology areas combined. As discussed 
further in Part IV, this result might be attributable to selection effects, 
but we think the question of district court versus Federal Circuit 
tendencies deserves a closer empirical look. 
e. Whether the patented invention originated outside the United 
States.  We included this variable because recent research has 
revealed that foreign-origin patents significantly outperformed their 
U.S.-origin counterparts in American patent litigation.106 In the 
present study, however, we found no significant effects of foreign 
origin on any of the § 112 outcomes in any technology field. Again, 
the two studies are very different in several fundamental respects.107 
f. Whether the patent had a non-U.S. (“foreign”) priority filing.  
Our goal in coding for whether the application for a patent in our 
dataset was originally filed outside the United States and using it as a 
control in our regression models is the same as that for using foreign 
invention origin as a variable. As with foreign invention origin, a 
foreign priority filing had no statistically significant effect on any of 
the three § 112 outcomes. 
 
 105. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 104–05 (2004); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim 
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 240 & n.32 (2005) (noting that 
“[t]he Federal Circuit has long been criticized as a pro-patentee forum” and citing many 
references). 
 106. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1796–97.  
 107. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
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g. Whether the decision occurred after the Federal Circuit’s 
Markman decision.  The 1995 Federal Circuit decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, affirmed the next year by the Supreme Court,108 
affected patent litigation as fundamentally as any ruling in the 
modern era by mandating that claim construction—interpretation of 
disputed language in patent claims—is the sole province of the court 
and must not be performed by juries.109 Claim construction is a 
prerequisite to all infringement and validity decisions, as the court 
must determine the exact contours of the patented invention before 
being able to decide or instruct a jury about either.110 Among other 
things, Markman greatly increased the focus on the claims in a patent, 
which brought indefiniteness allegations by defendants to the fore in 
each case in which any reasonable basis for such an allegation exists. 
The Markman rule is also critical for enablement and written-
description questions: it is these claims, as interpreted, that must be 
enabled by the specification and that must describe an invention 
clearly envisioned by the inventors in that specification. An 
eponymous Markman hearing takes place after at least some pretrial 
discovery in practically every patent-infringement case, the sole goal 
of which is construction of disputed claim terms based on evidence 
and arguments presented by the litigants.111 A district judge 
sometimes even makes decisions about claim definiteness (as a matter 
of law, naturally) in the claim-construction order, although many 
judges eschew this practice and render definiteness decisions before 
trial only in response to summary-judgment motions.112 For the cases 
in our dataset, we find that whether a decision occurred after the 
Federal Circuit’s Markman decision does not affect outcomes on 
either enablement or written description, but shows a highly 
significant effect on five-level claim-definiteness outcomes. Patent 
claims were much more likely to have been found definite (not 
indefinite) in cases decided after Markman than before (p<0.01). This 
does not mean that courts lowered the definiteness standard post-
Markman; rather, we suspect our result is driven by a large number of 
 
 108. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 109. Id. at 381–82. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra note 11.  
 112. See, e.g., Waddington N. Am., Inc. v. Sabert Corp., No. 09–4883 (GEB), 2010 WL 
4363137, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2010) (declining to resolve an indefiniteness argument at the 
claims-construction stage as the issue was “more appropriately tackled at summary judgment”). 
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weak indefiniteness challenges made by defendants during Markman 
hearings. 
h. The district in which the case was filed.  Patent-law 
commentators have debated for some time whether the federal 
district in which a patent litigant files its lawsuit matters to the suit’s 
outcome.113 Prior research does reveal some differences across 
districts. For example, a recent study by one of us found that out of 
the thirteen busiest federal districts for patent cases, patent owners 
were significantly more likely to win a case on all infringement and 
validity issues combined in the Eastern District of Texas, the District 
of Delaware, and the Southern District of New York.114 On the other 
hand, patent owners were significantly less likely to achieve such a 
definitive win in the Central District of California and the Northern 
District of Illinois.115 Here, the degrees of freedom permitted by our 
sample size and total number of dependent and independent 
variables led us to conclude that we should control for “district 
effects”—variations by district when other factors are held constant—
by including dummy variables for our three busiest federal districts as 
controls, with all other districts combined serving as the comparison 
dummy for district comparisons. Because the three top districts in our 
dataset account for over 400 of the 1104 patent-case pairs, we 
believed that if there were any significant district effects on our 
results, they would stand a good chance of being revealed. As 
previously noted, the three districts found to have heard the most 
§ 112 cases during the thirty-year period of our study were the 
District of Delaware, the Northern District of California, and the 
Eastern District of Texas. Whether a case was filed in any of these 
three districts had no statistically significant effect on enablement, 
written-description, or claim-definiteness outcomes. Again, this does 
not demonstrate the absence of an effect; it only means that we could 
not isolate an effect using our dataset. And our study does not 
examine possible district effects on definitive wins in patent-
infringement cases, but only on outcomes on the three § 112 issues. 
 
 113. See generally, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 631 (2015) (arguing that courts such as the Eastern District of Texas have favored 
plaintiffs to attract new patent cases). 
 114. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1790–95. The 
authors also cite and discuss other research on the question of whether the federal district in 
which a case is filed really matters. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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But the real importance of having variables for the top three districts 
is to control for any possible district effects on § 112 outcomes across 
technology areas, and not to show specific variations between 
districts. 
An additional variable that might influence outcomes is time. We 
thus reran all of the regressions presented here and in the Appendices 
with a continuous-year variable in addition to the post-Markman 
variable.116 If Westlaw’s increasing case coverage over time had a 
systematic effect on our variables of interest, or if there were a key 
change in doctrine over time besides Markman, it should be reflected 
in the coefficient for this variable. The coefficient on our continuous-
year variable was only statistically significant in the three-level 
indefiniteness regressions, when it was negative; in these regressions, 
the coefficient on the post-Markman variable was higher and more 
significant. Including the continuous-year variable did not change the 
significance of any other coefficients and had little effect on their 
magnitudes, including in the three-level indefiniteness models, giving 
us increased confidence that temporal effects do not skew our 
results.117 
C. Outcomes by Industry 
1. Scores on Ordinal Scales.  Table 5 shows the same descriptive 
analyses of outcomes by industries as we showed for technologies in 
Tables 1 and 2. As previously noted, the industry categories are 
mutually exclusive and are not separated into primary and secondary 
areas, and we separated the pharmaceutical-industry category into 
two subgroups: one containing patents in ANDA-related litigation 
and the other with patents in litigation not catalyzed by a generic 
drugmaker’s filing of an ANDA. Table 5 reports five-level and three-
level N’s, mean scores, and standard deviations for the three § 112 
issues by industry. 
 
 
 116. We would have included dummy variables for every year if we had had sufficient 
degrees of freedom, but our population size did not allow for this. 
 117. Although there is a limit to how many tables we think are useful to include even in an 
Appendix, we are happy to share these results upon request. As noted previously, our dataset 
will be published at the same time as this Article for readers who wish to test different models. 
See supra note 8. 
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5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 5-level 3-level 
Computer & 
Other Electronics 
N 32 32 30 30 102 102 
mean 2.56 1.59 3.07 2.13 4.11 2.560 
Sd 1.16 0.84 1.34 0.86 1.60 0.80 
Semiconductor 
N 26 26 15 15 22 22 
mean 3.39 2.27 4.13 2.80 4.05 2.68 
Sd 1.02 0.72 0.74 0.41 1.36 0.72 
Pharmaceutical 
(All) 
N 49 49 24 24 60 60 
mean 3.43 2.31 2.92 2.00 4.08 2.57 
Sd 1.34 0.87 1.02 0.89 1.36 0.72 
Pharmaceutical 
(ANDA) 
N 30 30 12 12 27 27 
mean 3.60 2.40 3.50 2.59 4.70 2.89 
Sd 1.33 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.32 
Pharmaceutical 
(Not ANDA) 
N 19 19 12 12 33 33 
mean 3.16 2.16 2.33 1.50 3.57 2.30 
Sd 1.34 0.90 0.89 0.67 1.56 0.85 
Biotechnology 
N 22 22 20 20 16 16 
mean 3.46 2.36 3.05 2.10 4.88 3 
Sd 1.18 0.79 1.47 0.85 0.34 0 
Medical Devices & 
Methods 
N 73 73 61 61 74 74 
mean 3.56 2.41 3.12 2.18 4.10 2.61 
Sd 1.21 0.70 1.42 0.83 1.48 0.76 
Communications 
N 21 21 17 17 59 59 
mean 3.67 2.38 3.12 2.18 3.83 2.46 
Sd 1.24 0.81 1.62 0.95 1.72 0.88 
Transportation 
(Incl. Auto) 
N 14 14 14 14 39 39 
mean 3.07 2.14 3.43 2.21 4.41 2.72 
Sd 1.54 0.86 1.40 0.70 1.37 0.69 
Construction 
N 16 16 9 9 28 28 
mean 3.75 2.50 3.67 2.56 4.25 2.68 
Sd 1.06 0.82 1.23 0.73 1.43 0.72 
Energy 
N 22 22 11 11 36 36 
mean 3.82 2.64 3.27 2.36 4.47 2.78 
sd 1.30 0.73 1.27 0.81 1.18 0.59 
Consumer Goods 
& Services 
N 37 37 29 29 82 82 
mean 3.97 2.51 3.90 2.55 4.20 2.62 
sd 1.14 0.65 1.21 0.69 1.46 0.75 
Industrial Goods 
& Services 
N 121 121 69 69 155 155 
mean 3.54 2.36 3.33 2.25 3.99 2.54 
sd 1.29 0.80 1.35 0.79 1.57 0.82 
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Across all categories, we again find higher average scores on 
claim definiteness than on the other two issues as one would expect, 
because these are the same patents challenged for indefiniteness as in 
the technology areas. But the differences between industries are 
interesting. Because we used eleven industry categories (twelve with 
the separation of the pharmaceutical category into its ANDA and 
non-ANDA subsets), numbers of observations in each are necessarily 
smaller and the scores have larger standard errors than those in the 
six technology areas, so they should be viewed with caution. Still, a 
number of the differences between mean-outcome scores for industry 
categories are statistically significant. 
Biotechnology-industry patents, which include patents from the 
biotechnology-technology area on inventions purporting to advance 
the science of biotech itself rather than claiming to have direct 
application to the pharmaceutical or medical-device/methods 
industries, survived indefiniteness assertions better than those in 
other industries. However, the unusually high score of 4.88 was based 
on only sixteen observations and is thus more susceptible to both 
selection effects and outliers. We will not continue to offer caveats 
about numbers of observations that are necessarily smaller than in 
our technology categories; the N’s are in Table 5. 
We report results for the pharmaceutical industry as a whole and 
then divide into those patents that were litigated as the result of 
ANDA filings by generic-drug manufacturers and those that were 
not. Patents in ANDA-related litigation survived contests over claim 
definiteness remarkably well, with a five-level score of 4.70, just 
below that experienced by patents from the biotechnology industry. 
This performance stands in stark contrast with that of pharmaceutical 
patents in non-ANDA litigation, which fared worse than any other 
industry grouping against assertions of indefiniteness. The 
definiteness chasm between patents in ANDA and non-ANDA 
pharmaceutical litigation may be caused by ANDA patents’ being 
more likely to cover compositions.118 These patents also are likely to 
have far more private economic value to their owners than many 
other kinds of patents, meaning that patentees will invest much more 
in fighting to preserve their validity.119 Energy-, transportation-, and 
 
 118. See supra note 80. 
 119. Researchers have uncovered evidence that the average patent on pharmaceutical 
compositions has more value than the average patent in other industries, and that patent 
protection is more important in this field than in others. See Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. 
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construction-industry patents, in descending order, likewise scored 
higher than the all-industry mean of 4.21, while patents in the 
consumer-goods/services and computer/other-electronics industries 
were barely below the mean. Semiconductor- and industrial-
goods/services-industry patents performed below the all-industry 
mean; communications-industry patents were next to the bottom, just 
ahead of the woefully performing non-ANDA pharmaceutical 
patents on definiteness. 
On the enablement requirement, patents on consumer 
goods/services scored the highest, followed closely by energy and 
construction. Also above the all-industry enablement mean of 3.47 
were communications, ANDA-related pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices/methods, and industrial goods/services. Below the mean in 
descending order were biotechnology, semiconductor, non-ANDA 
pharmaceutical, and transportation, with computer/other electronics 
well below at the bottom of the list. 
The mean of the eleven industry means for the written-
description requirement, at 3.36, was slightly below that for 
enablement. We find some of the same industries above and some of 
the same below the all-industry mean, we observed enough 
differences at all levels to make it clear that courts treat the two 
patent-disclosure requirements quite differently. Semiconductor-
industry patents as a group score highest on written description, and 
the non-ANDA pharmaceutical group again ranked lowest, although 
the range between top and bottom is not as extreme as it was in the 
case of enablement. Construction-industry patents again scored well, 
as did ANDA-related pharmaceuticals, and those in the 
computers/other-electronics industry again performed relatively 
poorly. Other industry groups were scattered around the all-industry 
mean. 
 
Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 796, 824; 
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986); 
Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 23, 32 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
pdf [http://perma.cc/D79H-Y5WQ]; see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents 
Does it Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 303 (2010) (“Although [the latest of the above-
referenced] surveys are over ten years old, the importance of patents to the pharmaceutical 
industry has not abated.”).  
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In Table 6, we average the three mean scores for each industry to 
take the same broad look at overall § 112 performance by industry 
that we did by technology.  





Consumer Goods & Services 4.02 





Transportation (Incl. Auto) 3.64 
Industrial Goods & Services 3.62 
Medical Devices & Methods 3.59 
Communications 3.54 
Pharmaceutical (All) 3.48 
Computer & Other Electronics 3.25 
Pharmaceutical (Non-ANDA) 3.02 
Mean 3.68 
 
The mean score for all industries across all three § 112 
requirements was 3.68; on our five-level scale, this falls between “3—
fact issue remaining” and “4—fact issue followed by a ruling of 
validity.” It would be interesting indeed to know how other 
patentability requirements compare with those mandated by § 112 
when scored on our five-level scale; it may be possible to see how the 
presumption of validity for granted patents is applied in practice 
across different doctrines.120 
Six industry categories score above the five-level mean for the 
combination of disclosure and definiteness requirements. In 
descending order, with little separation between them, they are 
consumer goods/services, ANDA-related pharmaceutical, 
construction, semiconductor, energy, and biotechnology. There is 
little separation between the first five industries below the all-
 
 120. Under 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012), patents are presumed valid, and this presumption can 
only be overcome by “clear and convincing evidence.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
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industry mean on all § 112 issues: transportation/automotive, 
industrial goods/services, medical devices/methods, communications, 
and pharmaceutical (all). The five-level mean for the next industry, 
computer/other electronics, is substantially lower, and non-ANDA 
pharmaceutical resides at the bottom of the heap. 
2. Regression Results by Industries and Issues.  Table 7 shows 
results from the ordered logit regression models on industries. For the 
regressions shown here, we separated pharmaceutical-industry 
patents into ANDA and non-ANDA categories; regressions with the 
pharmaceutical group as a whole are in the Appendix. We used 
industrial/business goods and services (that is, goods and services for 
wholesale purposes that do not fall into a more specific industry 
category) as the industry-comparison dummy. Although results for 
the other industries are presented in juxtaposition with the 
comparison dummy, one can also compare the coefficient for each 
industry against those of other industries. 
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Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-1.623*** -0.236 0.265 
(0.000205) (0.596) (0.424) 
Semiconductor 
-0.220 1.085** 0.0589 
(0.529) (0.0343) (0.893) 
Pharma: ANDA 
0.0905 0.155 0.722 
(0.832) (0.720) (0.531) 
Pharma: Non-ANDA 
-0.428 -1.214*** -0.682* 
(0.404) (0.00189) (0.0505) 
Biotechnology 
0.0277 -0.140 1.194 
(0.943) (0.819) (0.801) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.0212 -0.268 -0.0512 
(0.944) (0.556) (0.861) 
Communications 
0.125 -0.371 0.111 
(0.821) (0.664) (0.756) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-1.043 0.298 0.667 
(0.190) (0.700) (0.204) 
Construction 
0.0853 0.593 0.269 
(0.867) (0.490) (0.602) 
Energy 
0.702 -0.327 0.249 
(0.104) (0.573) (0.626) 
Consumer Goods & Services 
0.667 0.987** 0.175 
(0.138) (0.0473) (0.584) 
MPF Claim Element 
  -1.611*** 
(1.58e-08) 
Reissue Patent 
-0.192 0.340 0.364 
(0.696) (0.616) (0.759) 
Declaratory Judgment 
0.523* 0.344 -0.200 
(0.0955) (0.409) (0.463) 
District Court Decision 
0.614** -0.0269 0.453** 
(0.0152) (0.914) (0.0382) 
Foreign Origin 
1.343* 0.414 1.487 
(0.0529) (0.379) (0.352) 
Foreign Priority 
-0.747 0.152 -1.778 
(0.328) (0.776) (0.267) 
Post-Markman 
-0.315 -0.547* 0.541** 
(0.223) (0.0819) (0.0222) 
E.D. Tex. 
-0.640 0.210 -0.0510 
(0.234) (0.774) (0.874) 
N.D. Cal. 
-0.316 -0.0288 0.374 
(0.274) (0.941) (0.253) 
D. Del. 
-0.136 0.432 -0.114 
(0.633) (0.189) (0.662) 
N 433 299 673 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison industry is goods & services for industrial 
and business purposes. More positive coefficients mean patents were more likely to be held not 
invalid. 
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Computer/other-electronics-industry patents were far less likely 
to survive enablement contests than other industry groups, but this 
industry did not differ significantly from others on written description 
or definiteness. Patents in the semiconductor industry had better 
average validity outcomes than the industry norm on written 
description, and although ANDA-related pharmaceutical patents 
showed no significant differences from other industries on any of the 
three issues, non-ANDA pharmaceuticals performed quite poorly on 
written description and definiteness. The biotech, medical, 
communications, transportation, construction, and energy industries 
did not differ significantly from other industries on any of the issues, 
while consumer goods and services had better validity outcomes than 
the others on written description. 
As was the case with regression results for technology 
comparisons, our ordered logit models revealed only a few 
differences between industries. In both technologies and industries, 
we observed a few notable instances of § 112 outcome variations, but 
the overall picture is one of more similarity than dissimilarity on 
disclosure and definiteness requirements when the possible effects on 
outcomes of district variations and a number of other variables are 
neutralized. 
We introduced the same control variables in our industry logit 
models in Table 7 as for the technology models in Table 4. 
Unsurprisingly, we found similar results. As in the technology 
regressions, a disputed-claim term being in MPF format decreased the 
odds of a favorable ruling on definiteness (p<0.01), district courts 
were more likely than the Federal Circuit to favor patent owners on 
enablement and definiteness (p<0.05), and post-Markman decisions 
on definiteness were more favorable to the patentee (p<0.05). The 
industry-specific regression model also found that patents in post-
Markman cases did slightly worse (p<0.10) on written description. 
Whether a case was brought as a declaratory judgment, which had no 
significant effect in the technology regressions, had only a marginally 
significant effect on enablement rulings (p<0.10) in the industry 
regressions; interestingly, the positive coefficient means that the 
patent owner was slightly more likely to succeed on enablement when 
the potential infringer had preemptively sued seeking a declaratory 
judgment. Patents on foreign-origin inventions fared slightly better on 
enablement than did their American-origin counterparts (p<0.10). As 
with our technology logit models, we found no district effects. The 
same test with a continuous-year variable, that was described 
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previously for the technology models, was repeated for the industry 
models, with the same results.121 
D. Summary: Does the Subject Matter of Patents Really Matter in 
§ 112 Decisions? 
Our descriptive measures show that among technology groups, 
patents on inventions in the older electrical, mechanical, and 
chemistry fields were the most likely to be upheld against § 112 
challenges in reported decisions. Software-business-method patents 
fared better than most observers probably would have supposed, but 
software patents covering inventions that are not business methods 
performed poorly enough to bring down the software group’s 
performance as a whole to a very low level. When other influences on 
§ 112 outcomes were taken into account in our regression models, 
however, many of the technology-specific differences washed out, 
with only electronics patents performing better than those in other 
technology fields on written description and enablement, and 
mechanical patents scoring better on enablement. At the other end of 
the technology spectrum, software patents other than business 
methods fared poorly on enablement.122 
Across industry categories, pharmaceutical-industry patents in 
ANDA-related litigation performed very well on our descriptive 
measures, but non-ANDA pharmaceutical patents had weak 
outcomes. Patents in the computer-and-other-electronics industry 
also did not fare well relative to those in other industries, as most 
patent observers would have surmised. When other possible 
influences on § 112 outcomes are included, the regression results 
reveal that the ANDA-related pharmaceutical patents that 
performed so well in our descriptive results do not differ in any 
significant way from those in other industries, although non-ANDA 
pharmaceutical patents still do poorly on both written description and 
definiteness. Patents in the semiconductor industry and in consumer 
goods and services are significantly more likely than others to 
withstand challenges on written-description grounds. Aside from 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 116–17. 
 122. Technical (not business-method) software patents performing poorly on enablement 
means either that courts were applying this section 112 requirement to these patents with 
relative rigor or that the technical software patents that reached a decision on enablement 
tended to be less well enabled than other patents at that stage of litigation. 
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those mentioned, patents across industry groups do not differ 
significantly in their performance in the face of § 112 assaults. 
Regression results for factors other than technology and industry 
categories tell some interesting stories. In particular, patents across all 
technology and industry categories were much more likely to fall on 
indefiniteness grounds when the challenged claim element was 
drafted in means-plus-function format, and were more likely to 
survive indefiniteness challenges in post-Markman decisions. We also 
found that district courts as a group were significantly more likely 
than the Federal Circuit to uphold the validity of patents on 
enablement and definiteness grounds in both our technology and 
industry models. 
Thus, technology and industry do appear to matter when patents 
are challenged on disclosure and definiteness grounds, but only in a 
few out of many possible instances. Those few occasions in which we 
discovered differences sometimes worked out as observers might 
expect and sometimes they did not. The story is thus decidedly mixed. 
And the following Part sounds some additional notes of caution in 
interpreting these results. 
IV.  CAVEATS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results presented in Part III provide a detailed picture of 
how courts have adjudicated patent disclosure and definiteness across 
technologies and industries. But one must be cautious about 
extrapolating from these results to broader claims about nonlitigated 
patents or about the substantive legal standards. For example, based 
on our findings that the more technical software patents—those not 
covering business methods—are less likely to survive enablement 
challenges, one might be tempted to conclude that either (1) these 
kinds of software patents, on average, are less well enabled than other 
patents, or (2) courts have applied a more stringent enablement 
standard to software patents (or some combination of the two). But 
neither conclusion is necessarily correct. Patent applicants may draft 
these patents differently in the first place. And our dataset is not 
representative of all patents: not all patents are litigated; not all 
litigated patents have their validity challenged under § 112; and not 
all § 112 challenges result in a decision reported on Westlaw. 
Rather, most patent lawsuits settle. One of us has reported that 
of all patent lawsuits filed in 2008 or 2009, less than 10 percent 
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resulted in a merits decision.123 Differences in litigation outcomes 
(that is, in cases that do not settle) thus might stem from differences 
in the structure of litigation in different industries rather than 
differences in the substantive legal standards or in the underlying 
patents—a problem known as the selection effect. As George Priest 
and Benjamin Klein famously explained in 1984, when the parties to a 
litigation have equal stakes, rational expectations, and accurate 
information about expected outcomes, all but the most uncertain 
cases will settle, and plaintiff win rates will tend toward 50 percent 
regardless of the substantive legal standard.124 As these assumptions 
are relaxed, the win rate will vary; for example, Priest and Klein 
explain that when plaintiffs have more at stake than defendants, 
plaintiffs are likely to win more than 50 percent of cases—again, 
independent of the substantive legal standard.125 An extensive 
literature has documented the ways in which actual litigation deviates 
from the Priest-Klein assumptions,126 including in the patent context.127 
Thus, some of our observed deviations in outcome by technology 
or industry may be caused by technology-specific differences in which 
patents are litigated under § 112, or which litigations are likely to 
settle before any published decision. As one of us has explained in 
another paper, there are many plausible technology-specific selection 
stories.128 For example, pharmaceutical patent holders may have 
 
 123. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1780. 
 124. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5, 16–17 (1984). 
 125. Id. at 26. 
 126. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations 
from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 
J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (1996) (“Based on data from 3,529 cases, we find that ‘multimodal’ 
case characteristics associated with violations of these assumptions cause plaintiff win rates to 
deviate from the 50-percent baseline in the manner that simple law-and-economics models 
would suggest.”); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 493, 495 (1996) (“Although there are no errors of logic in the Priest-Klein 
model . . . the assumptions of the model that lead to the 50 percent tendency appear to be 
special . . . .”). 
 127. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek 
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 377 (2000) (“At least one of [the Priest-Klein] 
assumptions does not hold true in patent cases. . . . In most competitive markets, the patent 
holder has a much greater stake in the outcome of the litigation than does the alleged 
infringer.”). 
 128. Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 9, at 1125–40. 
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stronger incentives than other patent owners to settle their cases.129 
On the other hand, because each individual pharmaceutical patent is 
typically more valuable than the average patent in other industries,130 
patent owners may be more willing to undertake the high costs of 
patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry or take more care in 
drafting patents in the first place.131 It is also possible that judges 
might be less willing (perhaps subconsciously) to invalidate these 
patents because of the significant investment required for producing 
new drugs. Nonpracticing entities (NPEs), which are particularly 
 
 129. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug 
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948–49 (2011) (discussing the 
strong incentives of brand-name pharmaceutical companies to settle patent lawsuits). 
 130. See Ouellette, supra note 119, at 300–03 (reviewing the literature on the perceived high 
value of patents in the pharmaceutical industry, and providing data on the low number of 
patents per pharmaceutical product). 
 131. Possible selection effects on outcomes in ANDA-triggered pharmaceutical patent 
litigation are especially thorny, as summarized by the following excerpt from a prior study by 
one of us with Mark Lemley and David Schwartz: 
  One selection story relates to the particulars of pharmaceutical-industry patent 
litigation. Generic-drug litigation occurs under the [1984] Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
separates these cases from garden-variety patent infringement litigation. Before filing 
the lawsuit, the branded-drug patentee has an FDA-granted monopoly. The status 
quo is no competition, and there can be no direct infringement until the FDA 
approves the generic drug’s application, which in turn usually cannot happen until 
pending litigation is resolved. 
  Pharmaceutical-industry patent cases also routinely involve drugs with large 
market shares, prices, or profits. The costs of litigation to the branded manufacturer 
typically are small relative to the drug’s profits. These facts might push the branded 
companies to refuse to settle strong cases because they will win anyway. In fact, 
however, brand owners may have even stronger incentives than other patent owners 
to settle their cases. Because pharmaceutical patent owners will face no generic 
competition unless they lose a patent case, they have often pay their generic 
challengers to drop their challenges, in effect splitting the monopoly profits with the 
generic rather than taking the risk that the patent will be held invalid. Thus, unlike 
patentees in the other industries, branded-drug companies (the patent owners) 
sometimes offer to pay a generic, in an arrangement commonly known as a “reverse 
payment.” Such reverse-payment settlements were extremely common during the 
period of our dataset, though recent antitrust scrutiny may make them less likely in 
the future. 
  These different incentives make the direct comparison to “regular” patent 
litigation difficult. That said, it is not obvious that the selection story explains our 
results. The willingness of brand owners to use reverse payments to settle disputes 
might suggest that only particularly weak invalidity challenges (that is, valid patents) 
go to judgment, because only in those cases is the patentee willing to take a chance on 
a judicial outcome. But it could suggest the opposite—that generics lured by the 
promise of a reverse payment will refuse to settle only their strongest challenges. The 
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process itself may encourage weak drug 
challenges, with little downside risk to the generic beyond paying its own lawyers. 
The most we can say about the selection story as an explanation for our 
pharmaceutical-industry results is that patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry 
involves a variety of incentives that are distinct from other patent litigation, which 
may result in a different mix of patents surviving until adjudication. 
Allison et al., Divided Patent System, supra note 9, at 1128–29 (citations omitted). 
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prevalent in the software-technology area and in the broader 
computer industry, may be more willing to assert weaker patents and 
more interested in settling lawsuits.132 In sum, it is easy to generate 
plausible causal narratives,133 but hard to determine which directions 
these effects will cut in practice. 
Selection effects are particularly important to consider when 
evaluating the implications of our discovery that district courts 
decisions in our dataset were less likely to find patents invalid for 
enablement and indefiniteness than appellate court decisions. District 
court decisions invalidating patents may be more likely to be 
appealed than decisions upholding validity, which may explain part of 
our result. We also suspect that district court decisions are less likely 
to be reported in Westlaw than circuit court ones, and that decisions 
invalidating patents are probably more likely to be reported than 
those finding patents not invalid. If so, these database coverage issues 
would cut in the opposite direction as our result. This effect seems 
unlikely to be outweighed by the difference in appeal rate, but we 
cannot be sure. Thus, although we can confidently assert that patents 
were more likely to be upheld in reported district court § 112 
decisions than in appellate decisions, this does not necessarily mean 
that district court judges are more pro-patent than Federal Circuit 
judges. We think the sources of this effect warrant further study. 
If deviations from the 50-percent win rate were only due to 
violations of the Priest-Klein assumptions, then win-rate data would 
only illustrate these structural factors (such as differential stakes or 
information asymmetries), rather than substantive differences 
between cases. However, we have at least three reasons to think that 
our outcome results might be more illuminating: First, as Kevin 
Clermont has explained, case strength may survive the selection 
process “because of imperfect case selection,” such that “win rates 
may retain residual meaning, which the settlement process has not 
obliterated.”134 Indeed, Daniel Klerman and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee 
recently demonstrated that “under the three standard settlement 
 
 132. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689, 693–94 (2011) (finding that repeat patent 
plaintiffs, which are dominated by software-patent-owning NPEs, are more likely to settle their 
cases and more likely to lose when they go to final judgment).  
 133. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 199–202 (2011) (describing this 
phenomenon).  
 134. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1966 
(2009). 
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models and a wide array of parameters and distribution functions, the 
proportion of plaintiff victories at trial will vary in a predictable 
fashion with the legal standard, legal decision makers, or case 
characteristics.”135 Second, as Jason Rantanen has pointed out, the 
Priest-Klein hypothesis applies only to overall disputes, not to the 
selection of individual issues such as § 112 validity.136 Patent cases 
typically involve many issues, and if parties do not agree to drop 
issues that are not close calls, then outcomes on those issues might be 
more meaningful. Third, our nuanced coding of decisions in which 
fact issues remain (such as denials of summary judgment) captures a 
somewhat richer picture of § 112 adjudication than studies that have 
focused only on merits rulings that adjudicate an issue.137 Although 
many cases will be resolved before the court has any opportunity to 
opine on § 112 issues, our data at least include meaningful numbers of 
cases that are later settled.138 
From a methodological standpoint, we believe in the substantial 
value of empirically and doctrinally examining what courts do in 
patent law, both on specific issues and on broader policy questions 
and trends. When considering our specific empirical analyses, it is 
important to simultaneously keep the broader view in mind. Our 
findings on disclosure and definiteness holdings over a thirty-year 
period do not, for instance, say anything about overall patent quality 
or economic value. They also have little to say about overall patent 
litigation outcomes. John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz 
recently found that the overall win rate for patentees on both 
infringement and validity was only 26 percent, a rate consistent with 
that found previously by others.139 As Mark Lemley has observed, 
patent owners must overcome many distinct hurdles to win, and only 
 
 135. Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 209, 238 (2014). 
 136. Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases 3 
(Mar. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132810 [http://perma.cc/MT
7A-8SF9]. 
 137. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1790 (“[M]any 
cases are settled after a denial of summary judgment and before trial. These patents are not 
included in our statistics on definitive rulings, and many presumably involve a monetary 
payment to the patentee.”).  
 138. Also note that by focusing only on granted patents, we avoid the ambiguity of differing 
decision standards for patent applications that are not subject to the presumption of validity. See 
Ouellette, supra note 57, at 368 (discussing the application of Priest-Klein in the differing 
contexts of granted patents and applications). 
 139. Allison et al., Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, supra note 9, at 1787.  
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have to fail on one of them to lose the case.140 And to lose on a single 
invalidity assertion means to lose the patent itself. The phenomenon 
of conditional probabilities means that it takes only a few hurdles for 
a patent owner’s chances of prevailing in litigation to plummet. If, for 
example, a litigated patent is confronted by invalidity challenges on 
three separate grounds, a not unrealistic number,141 and if the 
likelihood of the patent owner’s success on each issue is 80 percent 
(giving the challenger a 20-percent chance of proving invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence on each issue), the patent owner stands 
only a 41-percent chance of winning on all of these validity issues, 
which translates to a 59-percent chance of losing its patent for good. 
A patent owner must also prove infringement to win a case, and if it 
has, say, a 50-percent chance of doing so, it has only a 20.5-percent 
chance of prevailing overall. 
CONCLUSION 
Our results show that over the past thirty years, judicial 
outcomes in reported cases on patent disclosure and claim 
definiteness have varied to some degree among technologies and 
industries. After other influences are factored in, however, the nature 
of such variability is not always as may have been supposed, and its 
degree not as striking as many observers may have guessed. We also 
discovered several factors other than technology and industry that 
were significantly correlated with different outcomes. District courts 
as a group were significantly more likely than the Federal Circuit to 
uphold patents against charges that they lacked an enabling 
specification or contained an indefinite claim. Claims drafted in 
means-plus-function format had significantly worse outcomes on 
indefiniteness. And post-Markman decisions were significantly more 
likely to uphold patents against indefiniteness challenges. 
As we have explained, one must be cautious in generalizing from 
our results to make broader claims about patent-litigation outcomes 
in general or about nonlitigated patents. Instances in which we found 
no statistically significant difference between outcomes for two 
groups of patents in our data do not disprove claims that courts have 
applied different legal standards to those two groups—the differences 
 
 140. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW 504 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
 141. We say that three invalidity challenges is not an unrealistic number based on our 
having read thousands of patent cases over a period of decades. 
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might have been simply washed out by selection effects. But it does 
show that courts have not reached dramatically different outcomes in 
the two groups. Our dataset also serves to identify the full population 
of reported § 112 decisions, which will facilitate more contextual 
analysis of particular doctrines with confidence that the results are 
not based on mere anecdotes. We thus believe that this project will 
enrich future discussions of § 112 reform.  
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APPENDIX 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.442 0.424 0.340 0.333 
(0.212) (0.237) (0.256) (0.311) 
Electrical 
0.0765 0.112 -0.101 -0.103 
(0.787) (0.710) (0.707) (0.736) 
Chemistry 
0.0324 0.0575 -0.111 -0.126 
(0.931) (0.885) (0.736) (0.719) 
Biotechnology 
-0.112 0.111 -0.330 -0.182 
(0.806) (0.817) (0.415) (0.670) 
Software 
-1.044*** -1.035*** -0.902*** -0.915*** 
(0.00161) (0.00156) (0.00600) (0.00899) 
Software (BusMeth) 





























F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
30.56*** 27.49*** 22.42*** 16.62*** 
(1.14e-05) (4.58e-05) (0.00044) (0.00528) 
N 433 433 433 433 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.490 0.479 0.365 0.368 
(0.177) (0.207) (0.233) (0.270) 
Electrical 
0.132 0.183 -0.0709 -0.0559 
(0.669) (0.567) (0.798) (0.856) 
Chemistry 
0.0785 0.118 -0.0869 -0.0850 
(0.836) (0.772) (0.789) (0.816) 
Biotechnology 
-0.0626 0.173 -0.305 -0.141 
(0.891) (0.722) (0.437) (0.741) 
Software 
Software (BusMeth) 
-0.504 -0.392 -0.378 -0.246 
(0.473) (0.518) (0.540) (0.709) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
-1.121*** -1.116*** -0.979*** -1.002*** 




























F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
29.97*** 26.43*** 22.36*** 19.78*** 
(3.98e-05) (0.00019) (0.00104) (0.00303) 
N 433 433 433 433 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.217 0.228 0.206 0.251 
(0.570) (0.583) (0.510) (0.496) 
Electrical 
1.456*** 1.520*** 1.097*** 1.300*** 
(0.000355) (0.000831) (0.000123) (0.00022) 
Chemistry 
0.378 0.283 0.265 0.175 
(0.442) (0.596) (0.499) (0.673) 
Biotechnology 
-0.0800 0.108 -0.0382 0.117 
(0.880) (0.840) (0.931) (0.807) 
Software 
-0.509 -0.370 -0.454 -0.374 
(0.180) (0.364) (0.152) (0.286) 
Software (BusMeth) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
23.55*** 15.48*** 25.34*** 21.43*** 
(0.000265) (0.00850) (0.000120) (0.00067) 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.151 0.144 0.148 0.176 
(0.704) (0.756) (0.637) (0.646) 
Electrical 
1.370*** 1.412*** 1.037*** 1.221*** 
(0.00122) (0.00147) (0.000273) (0.000990) 
Chemistry 
0.316 0.186 0.210 0.0934 
(0.524) (0.748) (0.600) (0.827) 
Biotechnology 
-0.149 0.0140 -0.0981 0.0386 
(0.779) (0.981) (0.827) (0.938) 
Software 
    
Software (BusMeth) 
-1.048* -0.972 -0.926* -0.842 
(0.0528) (0.136) (0.0688) (0.183) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
-0.348 -0.218 -0.322 -0.269 
(0.368) (0.597) (0.316) (0.457) 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
24.54*** 20.19*** 26.90*** 21.41*** 
(0.000416) (0.00256) (0.000151) (0.00155) 
N 299 299 299 299 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.233 0.185 0.347 0.294 
(0.508) (0.664) (0.273) (0.461) 
Electrical 
-0.151 -0.133 -0.0535 0.00597 
(0.600) (0.688) (0.840) (0.985) 
Chemistry 
-0.225 -0.339 0.0532 0.00375 
(0.572) (0.450) (0.875) (0.993) 
Biotechnology 
0.193 0.339 0.382 0.427 
(0.888) (0.803) (0.450) (0.481) 
Software 
-0.515 -0.165 0.00272 0.242 
(0.120) (0.690) (0.993) (0.535) 
Software (BusMeth) 
    
Software (Not BusMeth) 
    




























































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
11.37** 4.119 4.328 2.245 
(0.045) (0.532) (0.503) (0.814) 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.168 0.120 0.304 0.259 
(0.641) (0.784) (0.309) (0.512) 
Electrical 
-0.243 -0.229 -0.113 -0.0525 
(0.412) (0.503) (0.674) (0.874) 
Chemistry 
-0.293 -0.407 0.00833 -0.0337 
(0.461) (0.392) (0.980) (0.937) 
Biotechnology 
0.122 0.261 0.336 0.382 
(0.923) (0.850) (0.618) (0.506) 
Software 
    
Software (BusMeth) 
-0.991** -0.694 -0.365 -0.138 
(0.0287) (0.180) (0.382) (0.787) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
-0.430 -0.0505 0.0701 0.326 
(0.203) (0.909) (0.808) (0.418) 




























































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
14.77** 6.666 5.859 3.470 
(0.0221) (0.353) (0.439) (0.748) 
N 673 673 673 673 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics.  
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Table A4. Enablement Outcomes by Technology (Primary Only) 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.994** 1.007** 1.070** 1.095** 
(0.0268) (0.0209) (0.0194) (0.0187) 
Electrical 
0.750 0.874* 0.773 0.859* 
(0.153) (0.0777) (0.136) (0.0793) 
Chemistry 
0.520 0.574 0.579 0.602 
(0.262) (0.185) (0.214) (0.191) 
Biotechnology 
0.389 0.653 0.352 0.548 
(0.460) (0.208) (0.505) (0.277) 
Software 
-0.614 -0.528 -0.335 -0.297 
(0.192) (0.226) (0.479) (0.542) 
Software (BusMeth) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
38.82*** 28.70*** 30.03*** 25.80*** 
(2.6e-07) (2.7e-05) (1.5e-05) (9.8e-05) 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.996** 1.008** 1.072** 1.099** 
(0.0287) (0.0254) (0.0167) (0.0195) 
Electrical 
0.751 0.877* 0.774 0.864* 
(0.151) (0.0761) (0.116) (0.0873) 
Chemistry 
0.521 0.585 0.581 0.616 
(0.253) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) 
Biotechnology 
0.390 0.657 0.353 0.556 
(0.462) (0.218) (0.475) (0.293) 
Software 
    
Software (BusMeth) 
-0.0321 0.123 0.297 0.475 
(0.955) (0.848) (0.663) (0.554) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
-0.765 -0.765 -0.681 -0.469 
(0.101) (0.169) (0.332) (0.396) 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
34.86*** 30.42*** 29.83*** 28.68*** 
(4.6e-06) (3.3e-05) (4.2e-05) (7.00e-05) 
N 433 433 433 433 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.561 0.465 0.405 0.371 
(0.608) (0.623) (0.394) (0.501) 
Electrical 
1.325 1.293 1.080** 1.205** 
(0.258) (0.206) (0.0308) (0.0397) 
Chemistry 
0.583 0.385 0.375 0.231 
(0.598) (0.697) (0.441) (0.685) 
Biotechnology 
0.126 0.223 0.0776 0.183 
(0.911) (0.824) (0.890) (0.753) 
Software 
-0.167 -0.127 -0.231 -0.192 
(0.879) (0.896) (0.628) (0.728) 
Software (BusMeth) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
15.56*** 9.558* 14.07** 11.33** 
(0.008) (0.0888) (0.0152) (0.0453) 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.563 0.453 0.409 0.370 
(0.571) (0.661) (0.390) (0.513) 
Electrical 
1.330 1.290 1.088** 1.217** 
(0.245) (0.247) (0.0335) (0.0416) 
Chemistry 
0.586 0.348 0.380 0.212 
(0.562) (0.747) (0.442) (0.710) 
Biotechnology 
0.127 0.207 0.0792 0.182 
(0.901) (0.849) (0.884) (0.765) 
Software 
    
Software (BusMeth) 
-0.744 -0.802 -0.712 -0.727 
(0.470) (0.472) (0.211) (0.280) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
0.120 0.175 0.0103 0.0677 
(0.905) (0.866) (0.984) (0.910) 






















































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
16.94*** 13.18** 17.36*** 14.12** 
(0.0095) (0.040) (0.0081) (0.0283) 
N 299 299 299 299 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. 
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Table A6. Indefiniteness Outcomes by Technology (Primary Only) 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.232 0.122 0.131 0.0372 
(0.895) (0.943) (0.875) (0.951) 
Electrical 
-0.163 -0.0937 -0.279 -0.179 
(0.927) (0.957) (0.742) (0.787) 
Chemistry 
-0.252 -0.394 -0.230 -0.285 
(0.886) (0.818) (0.784) (0.643) 
Biotechnology 
0.152 0.270 0.0986 0.128 
(0.942) (0.897) (0.915) (0.862) 
Software 
-0.621 -0.324 -0.337 -0.133 
(0.724) (0.850) (0.690) (0.832) 
Software (BusMeth) 
    
Software (Not BusMeth) 
    




























































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
13.49** 4.112 6.066 2.143 
(0.0192) (0.533) (0.300) (0.829) 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Mechanical 
0.232 0.126 0.131 0.0406 
(0.895) (0.955) (0.901) (0.957) 
Electrical 
-0.163 -0.0923 -0.280 -0.180 
(0.926) (0.967) (0.798) (0.820) 
Chemistry 
-0.252 -0.394 -0.230 -0.284 
(0.887) (0.860) (0.829) (0.710) 
Biotechnology 
0.152 0.266 0.0986 0.125 
(0.943) (0.916) (0.930) (0.882) 
Software 
    
Software (BusMeth) 
-0.947 -0.705 -0.589 -0.407 
(0.592) (0.755) (0.590) (0.621) 
Software (Not BusMeth) 
-0.501 -0.166 -0.251 -0.0290 
(0.774) (0.941) (0.812) (0.970) 




























































F-test for Joint Tech. 
Effects 
14.74** 6.081 6.316 3.126 
(0.0224) (0.414) (0.389) (0.793) 
N 673 673 673 673 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics.  
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Table A7. Enablement Outcomes by Industry 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-1.872*** -1.941*** -1.421*** -1.618*** 
(9.11e-05) (0.00142) (2.53e-05) (0.000155) 
Semiconductor 
-0.304 -0.149 -0.332 -0.227 
(0.392) (0.708) (0.299) (0.494) 
Pharma 
-0.0888 -0.0773 -0.139 -0.118 
(0.807) (0.851) (0.671) (0.751) 
Pharma (ANDA)  
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
Biotechnology 
-0.0225 0.196 -0.165 0.0287 
(0.974) (0.694) (0.671) (0.942) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.0378 0.173 0.000370 0.0137 
(0.889) (0.589) (0.999) (0.963) 
Communications 
0.0425 0.115 0.160 0.119 
(0.933) (0.823) (0.719) (0.823) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-0.530 -0.830 -0.632 -1.050 
(0.359) (0.219) (0.360) (0.191) 
Construction 
0.459 0.255 0.223 0.0878 
(0.779) (0.831) (0.608) (0.867) 
Energy 
0.924 1.007 0.480 0.702 
(0.498) (0.384) (0.232) (0.120) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.283 0.259 0.669* 0.659 




























F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
21.57** 16.26* 29.80*** 24.61*** 
(0.0174) (0.0924) (0.00092) (0.00613) 
N 433 433 433 433 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-1.874*** -1.948*** -1.425*** -1.623*** 
(7.56e-05) (0.00043) (2.43e-05) (0.000205) 
Semiconductor 
-0.305 -0.142 -0.333 -0.220 
(0.409) (0.719) (0.314) (0.529) 
Pharma 
    
Pharma (ANDA) 
0.178 0.205 0.128 0.0905 
(0.709) (0.705) (0.768) (0.832) 
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
-0.475 -0.474 -0.548 -0.428 
(0.383) (0.550) (0.280) (0.404) 
Biotechnology 
-0.0225 0.192 -0.165 0.0277 
(0.964) (0.713) (0.679) (0.943) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.0379 0.181 0.000320 0.0212 
(0.894) (0.575) (0.999) (0.944) 
Communications 
0.0425 0.122 0.160 0.125 
(0.935) (0.810) (0.733) (0.821) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-0.530 -0.830 -0.633 -1.043 
(0.473) (0.239) (0.342) (0.190) 
Construction 
0.459 0.252 0.223 0.0853 
(0.765) (0.891) (0.612) (0.867) 
Energy 
0.925 1.006 0.482 0.702 
(0.464) (0.523) (0.262) (0.104) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.283 0.264 0.670* 0.667 
(0.429) (0.501) (0.0996) (0.138) 






















































F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
22.57** 16.98 31.17*** 26.86*** 
(0.0203) (0.108) (0.00103) (0.00483) 
N 433 433 433 433 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison industry is goods & services for industrial 
and business purposes. 
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Table A8. Written Description Outcomes by Industry 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-0.239 -0.0646 -0.347 -0.215 
(0.589) (0.889) (0.388) (0.632) 
Semiconductor 
1.567 1.683 0.989** 1.038** 
(0.612) (0.575) (0.0221) (0.0345) 
Pharma 
-0.546 -0.564 -0.566* -0.555 
(0.269) (0.319) (0.0891) (0.129) 
Pharma (ANDA)  
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
Biotechnology 
-0.322 -0.0633 -0.366 -0.147 
(0.512) (0.909) (0.487) (0.796) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
-0.139 -0.170 -0.262 -0.283 
(0.679) (0.685) (0.441) (0.549) 
Communications 
-0.0848 -0.423 -0.166 -0.374 
(0.902) (0.573) (0.804) (0.661) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-0.129 0.206 0.0814 0.293 
(0.776) (0.715) (0.922) (0.712) 
Construction 
0.811 1.063 0.450 0.592 
(0.802) (0.741) (0.655) (0.389) 
Energy 
0.292 0.00164 -0.0665 -0.304 
(0.825) (0.999) (0.901) (0.599) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.778* 1.075** 0.850* 0.967* 
(0.0877) (0.0320) (0.0613) (0.0544) 






















































F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
6.861 8.353 19.55** 21.16** 
(0.739) (0.594) (0.0338) (0.0200) 
N 299 299 299 299 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-0.241 -0.0935 -0.350 -0.236 
(0.600) (0.843) (0.389) (0.596) 
Semiconductor 
1.577 1.754 1.000** 1.085** 
(0.585) (0.593) (0.0241) (0.0343) 
Pharma 
    
Pharma (ANDA) 
0.734 0.947 0.120 0.155 
(0.734) (0.617) (0.740) (0.720) 
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
-1.672 -1.914 -1.254*** -1.214*** 
(0.245) (0.109) (0.00145) (0.00189) 
Biotechnology 
-0.325 -0.0568 -0.370 -0.140 
(0.517) (0.925) (0.486) (0.819) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
-0.141 -0.155 -0.263 -0.268 
(0.683) (0.724) (0.449) (0.556) 
Communications 
-0.0857 -0.433 -0.166 -0.371 
(0.900) (0.692) (0.807) (0.664) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-0.130 0.200 0.0801 0.298 
(0.789) (0.723) (0.904) (0.700) 
Construction 
0.817 1.072 0.457 0.593 
(0.773) (0.711) (0.553) (0.490) 
Energy 
0.295 -0.0420 -0.0639 -0.327 
(0.812) (0.978) (0.951) (0.573) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.785* 1.105** 0.858* 0.987** 
(0.0841) (0.0300) (0.0639) (0.0473) 






















































F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
7.790 9.307 28.97*** 28.79*** 
(0.732) (0.594) (0.00229) (0.00244) 
N 299 299 299 299 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison industry is goods & services for industrial 
and business purposes.  
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Table A9. Indefiniteness Outcomes by Industry 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
0.0691 0.0892 0.362 0.249 
(0.807) (0.797) (0.193) (0.458) 
Semiconductor 
0.462 0.827 -0.266 0.0460 
(0.841) (0.680) (0.456) (0.917) 
Pharma 
-0.0670 -0.306 -0.0187 -0.168 
(0.838) (0.384) (0.944) (0.592) 
Pharma (ANDA)  
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
Biotechnology 
15.28*** 13.31*** 1.440 1.180 
(0) (0) (0.743) (0.811) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.182 0.0388 0.0625 -0.0589 
(0.571) (0.914) (0.812) (0.846) 
Communications 
-0.185 0.128 -0.148 0.109 
(0.610) (0.739) (0.647) (0.755) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
0.647 0.425 0.865 0.648 
(0.365) (0.622) (0.291) (0.449) 
Construction 
0.473 0.307 0.339 0.265 
(0.717) (0.848) (0.473) (0.602) 
Energy 
0.806 0.426 0.689 0.262 
(0.620) (0.723) (0.304) (0.717) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.235 0.0881 0.325 0.158 
(0.473) (0.803) (0.264) (0.610) 




























































F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
675.5 276.6 6.693 2.642 
(0) (0) (0.754) (0.989) 
N 673 673 673 673 
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(5) (6) (7) (8) 
3-level 3-level 5-level 5-level 
Computer & Other 
Electronics 
0.0691 0.105 0.363 0.265 
(0.817) (0.757) (0.207) (0.424) 
Semiconductor 
0.462 0.837 -0.266 0.0589 
(0.818) (0.708) (0.468) (0.893) 
Pharma     
Pharma (ANDA) 
1.127 0.862 0.969 0.722 
(0.664) (0.797) (0.308) (0.531) 
Pharma (non-ANDA) 
-0.665* -0.920** -0.594* -0.682* 
(0.0608) (0.0244) (0.0697) (0.0505) 
Biotechnology 
13.62*** 13.33*** 1.442 1.194 
(0) (0) (0.751) (0.801) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.182 0.0493 0.0627 -0.0512 
(0.579) (0.893) (0.816) (0.861) 
Communications 
-0.185 0.133 -0.148 0.111 
(0.601) (0.728) (0.637) (0.756) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
0.647 0.443 0.867 0.667 
(0.513) (0.549) (0.287) (0.204) 
Construction 
0.473 0.307 0.339 0.269 
(0.666) (0.798) (0.601) (0.602) 
Energy 
0.806 0.413 0.690 0.249 
(0.491) (0.789) (0.136) (0.626) 
Consumer Goods & 
Services 
0.235 0.105 0.326 0.175 
(0.476) (0.758) (0.275) (0.584) 




























































F-test for Joint Industry 
Effects 
460 291.2 14.32 9.296 
(0) (0) (0.216) (0.595) 
N 673 673 673 673 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
ordered logit estimator. The unspecified comparison industry is goods & services for industrial 
and business purposes. 
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Table A10. Linear Probability Two-Level Outcomes by Technology 
 
Enablement Written Description Claim Definiteness 
Combined Primary Combined Primary Combined Primary 
Mechanical 
0.0989 0.205 0.0756 0.0581 0.0103 0.00544 
(0.243) (0.139) (0.429) (0.831) (0.877) (0.952) 
Electrical 
0.0165 0.139 0.298*** 0.194 -0.0272 -0.00601 
(0.850) (0.358) (5.88e-05) (0.492) (0.605) (0.951) 
Chemistry 
0.0332 0.128 0.0686 -0.00231 -0.0366 -0.0405 
(0.744) (0.377) (0.545) (0.993) (0.603) (0.666) 
Biotech-
nology 
0.00764 0.104 0.0329 -0.0239 0.0335 0.0288 
(0.946) (0.509) (0.794) (0.931) (0.692) (0.779) 
Software 
(BusMeth) 
-0.148 -0.0314 -0.349** -0.381 -0.133 -0.140 




-0.336*** -0.277* -0.0416 -0.0421 -0.0107 -0.0362 
(0.000366) (0.0699) (0.653) (0.885) (0.868) (0.696) 
MPF 
Claim 





0.0312 0.0597 0.0270 0.0398 0.0534 0.0516 




-0.0437 -0.0311 0.0828 0.0525 -0.00463 -0.00713 
(0.470) (0.616) (0.392) (0.598) (0.923) (0.879) 
District Ct. 
Decision 
0.240*** 0.227*** 0.0910 0.102 0.117*** 0.115*** 
(2.32e-05) (4.56e-05) (0.156) (0.119) (0.00412) (0.00282) 
Foreign 
Origin 
0.311* 0.307* 0.135 0.183 0.117** 0.115* 
(0.0567) (0.0582) (0.381) (0.200) (0.0497) (0.0511) 
Foreign 
Priority 
-0.291* -0.286* 0.00128 -0.0685 -0.143** -0.138** 
(0.0920) (0.0831) (0.994) (0.653) (0.0400) (0.0490) 
Post-
Markman 
-0.102 -0.0887 -0.300*** -0.295*** -0.0236 -0.0210 
(0.125) (0.171) (5.06e-05) (0.000129) (0.619) (0.655) 
E.D. Tex. 
-0.262* -0.245* -0.130 -0.0676 -0.0690 -0.0580 
(0.0552) (0.0751) (0.503) (0.686) (0.164) (0.233) 
N.D. Cal. 
0.0974 0.0926 0.0686 0.0432 0.0627 0.0651 
(0.454) (0.467) (0.603) (0.740) (0.190) (0.158) 
D. Del. 
-0.0840 -0.0814 0.0895 0.0864 0.0519 0.0555 
(0.204) (0.205) (0.262) (0.275) (0.213) (0.189) 
N 324 324 215 215 633 633 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
linear probability estimator. The unspecified comparison technology variable is optics. 
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Computer & Other 
Electronics 
-0.510*** -0.111 0.0281 
(1.11e-05) (0.417) (0.584) 
Semiconductor 
-0.0114 0.307*** 0.140 
(0.930) (0.00851) (0.112) 
Pharma (ANDA) 
0.0141 0.124 0.182*** 
(0.892) (0.460) (9.25e-06) 
Pharma (Non-ANDA) 
-0.0598 -0.486*** -0.115 
(0.655) (0.000740) (0.227) 
Biotechnology 
0.0513 -0.0691 0.174*** 
(0.641) (0.656) (9.96e-06) 
Medical Devices & Methods 
0.0844 -0.0101 0.0203 
(0.221) (0.926) (0.703) 
Communications 
-0.00956 -0.187 0.0244 
(0.940) (0.268) (0.690) 
Transportation (Incl. Auto) 
-0.130 0.0967 0.0468 
(0.367) (0.632) (0.457) 
Construction 
-0.0130 0.223 0.0370 
(0.924) (0.176) (0.614) 
Energy 
0.137 -0.0809 0.0557 
(0.232) (0.621) (0.452) 
Consumer Goods & Services 
0.0973 0.247** 0.0253 
(0.259) (0.0170) (0.616) 
MPF Claim Element 
  -0.331*** 
(4.90e-08) 
Reissue Patent 
0.0422 -0.0942 0.0552 
(0.777) (0.470) (0.446) 
Declaratory Judgment 
0.0669 0.130 0.00236 
(0.334) (0.233) (0.959) 
District Court Decision 
0.215*** 0.0469 0.118*** 
(0.000297) (0.497) (0.00193) 
Foreign Origin 
0.348** 0.190 0.129* 
(0.0183) (0.158) (0.0651) 
Foreign Priority 
-0.360** -0.0771 -0.144* 
(0.0194) (0.621) (0.0725) 
Post-Markman 
-0.0854 -0.442*** -0.0493 
(0.221) (1.87e-05) (0.303) 
E.D. Tex. 
-0.235 0.157 -0.0654 
(0.103) (0.392) (0.176) 
N.D. Cal. 
0.0790 0.0245 0.0399 
(0.476) (0.851) (0.361) 
D. Del. 
-0.0590 0.120 0.0471 
(0.384) (0.170) (0.279) 
N 324 215 633 
Values in parentheses are p-values, with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use the 
linear probability estimator. The unspecified comparison industry is goods & services for 
industrial and business purposes. 
 
